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

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

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

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Annual Political Book Award

The Washington Monthly wishes to recognize the best of those books that explore the processes and values of the institutions that govern America, the books that share our purpose of identifying where the system breaks down, why it breaks down, and what can be done to make it work.





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

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From World War II to Clay Felker: How America Bought Its Way to Happiness

by Nicholas Lemann

We live in a consumer society, and its roots lie in World War II. The origins of our times get clouded over the years, as memories fade; it's tempting to think of the war as an end instead of a beginning, as the last good ideological fight. So it's good to have some reminding from time to time, which is what John Morton Blum's *V Was for Victory** does splendidly. *V* is subtitled *Politics and American Culture During World War II*, and its most striking sections are devoted to clearing up various myths about the war. Blum shows that a fight for democracy, while perhaps what Franklin Roosevelt had in mind, was not what sold the war to the American people; instead, it was a destroy-or-be-destroyed battle against specific, personified enemies, Hitler and the Japanese.

Because of that simple formulation of our goals, and because of the fear and misery soldiers and their families had to endure, nothing seemed more important than winning, getting it over with, and returning to an America not substantively different from the one the soldiers left. Consequently, the war ended in a sort of weary moral vacuum: the cause having been Hitler, and Hitler having been defeated, neither an enduring particular cause nor any stomach for causes generally lived on into the postwar years.

Soldiers' explanations of what it was all about had a curiously empty quality, as if the pain and single-mindedness of the struggle had done away with all else. In a government-produced radio drama, the best way an enlistee could explain the war to his sweetheart was to say it was "about love and gettin' hitched, and havin' a home and some kids, and breathin' fresh air out in the suburbs. . . ." What sporadic attempts there were to keep mass idealism alive in the late 40s—the American Veterans Committee, the United World Federalists—got nowhere.

That was the mood: people were disposed to fight no further battles, except perhaps on their own behalf. In itself, that would not have been enough to shape America today; but it was accompanied by the advent of a new, affluent, meritocratic class structure that let veterans carry out their postwar mood to its logical conclusion.

*Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976.

Nicholas Lemann is an editor of The Washington Monthly. *He was assisted in the research for this article by Aleta Kaufman and Bonita Moul.*

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The Most Reliable Means

The chief agent of the class shake-up was the G.I. Bill of Rights, which was designed to guarantee a life of relative prosperity to the average foot-soldier—a novel concept in itself. This was accomplished mainly through the most reliable means of upward mobility, education. Given the chance for years of schooling at the government's expense, a great many of the working-class boys who went off to Italy or the Pacific returned to a whole new world—college, often professional school, and, as the fifties wore on, on to genuine financial comfort. The number of college graduates in America was 13 million higher in 1950 than it had been in 1940, and by 1960 it was 12 million higher again. While the percentage of the population that had graduated from college actually dropped during the 30s, between 1940 and 1970 it nearly tripled. If the veterans had no desire to change the basic order of America, they did want a bigger slice of the pie for themselves, and they studied earnestly to get it.

Of course college in itself could not have guaranteed mass financial prosperity. An economic boom was needed, and the war provided that too. As Blum shows, between Pearl Harbor and V-J Day, the gross national product nearly doubled. Personal liquid assets nearly tripled. In Washington, D.C., an especially prosperous wartime city, average family income went up from $2,227 to $5,316. For the first time in more than a decade, consumption rose to a decent, if not affluent, level. The good times continued after the war was over, and because of the G.I. Bill their largesse was dispensed in new, democratic patterns.

The war had created America's first genuine moneyed, meritocratic class and had destroyed that class' members' political idealism. So what followed was a period of intense upward mobility tempered by no particular set of beliefs. Getting and spending became ends in themselves, and their volume and quality were sources of endless fascination. Millions of people eagerly took their first European vacation; millions were captivated by the play "My Fair Lady," an upward-mobility fairy tale. *The New Yorker* grew thick with travel and clothing ads. As the sense of personal worth and identity got more tied up with buying things, the art of buying became ever more complicated and refined.

One of the early organizations to catch on to this was Time Inc., which a few years after the war put a lot of money into a national survey by the Politz organization, designed to predict the shape of postwar America. The survey's conclusion was that the greatest impact of the war on American life would be the huge increase it caused in discretionary income—that is, money that Americans would have left over after paying for essentials. America was now going to have an affluent middle class, and Time took heed of it; a special planning team used the Politz results to lay the groundwork for *Sports Illustrated*, a magazine aimed at the new class and its money.

One member of that planning team was Clay Felker, then in his early days at Time. A lot of water is under the bridge since then, but Felker has always heeded the survey's lessons well; if anything has shaped his life since then, it's been the mood the war created. He has understood it all along, and figured out, better than anyone else, how to speak to the society it created. In the process he has brought a widely influential form of journalism into being and through that, in the manner of master politician, has by sensing and speaking to part of the public mood also crystallized and defined that mood.

Back in the early fifties, the affluence the war brought on was very good news to someone like Clay Felker, intelligent and sophisticated

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and just starting out in the magazine world. It meant that magazines could survive by aiming their editorial content exclusively at the well-to-do, since there were now enough of them to support quite a few magazines. Besides being fortuitous in that way, the postwar affluence came just in time: television was beginning its slow process of killing off mass-market magazine journalism. Advertisers had little reason to buy space in *Colliers* and reach perhaps ten million average Americans when they could buy time on TV and reach 50 million; but for products like Scotch or foreign travel, which were beyond the average American's reach, TV was a waste of money. Magazines survived by offering the Scotch audience to advertisers more efficiently than anyone else could offer it. To be cynical, this is the major reason why there are a lot of magazines in America today: they are the best way for advertisers to reach affluent people exclusively.

A Badge of One's Place

The war made it possible for magazines to move "upscale," as it's called in the trade, and TV made it necessary. They began to appeal more and more to specialized audiences—eaters (*Gourmet*) or travelers (*Holiday*), for instance—or barring that, to a more general group of readers interested in quality writing, sophistication, and high-level consumer goods. Keeping up with social and intellectual styles was becoming important to a rapidly growing part of the population, since knowing those styles was a badge of one's place in the class structure. Magazines served that need—through their articles and through their ads, each of which skirted around one side of the delicate status question.

Felker, as the fifties ended, was bouncing around in this world. He left *Esquire* after the magazine's editorship passed from Arnold Gingrich to Harold T. P. Hayes instead of to Felker himself, and became editor of the Sunday supplement of the old



1945 Maytag ad

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New York *Herald Tribune*. The *Tribune*, a victim of various demographic forces, quickly folded, and Felker and his supplement were absorbed into the new *World Journal Tribune*, which folded itself in 1967. Felker's supplement was by that time quite popular; it featured heavy cultural coverage and long articles by people like Tom Wolfe, Jimmy Breslin, Gloria Steinem, and Pete Hamill. He decided to launch it independently, under its old name, *New York*.

New York was aiming at the same kind (and size) of audience that read *The New Yorker*, and it was strongly pitched toward residents of New York City. Felker saw that while in the first half of this century there was a large common package of information that people all over America were interested in getting from magazines, now TV was so strong and the country so big and dispersed that readers wanted something more specialized. The existing big national magazines were putting a lot of money into special regional editions, and city magazines—often started by Chambers of Commerce as local status symbols, but now breaking away—were multiplying and starting to boom.

The demand for these magazines is easy to understand. Since the war daily newspapers had become less numerous and were leaving a lot uncovered. Also, mass upward mobility had created a group of people accustomed to moving economically and geographically and not familiar with the basic information (who's in power, where to get a good meal) that in the past had come just from growing to maturity in a particular neighborhood. It was this gap in information that the city magazines were starting to fill. Felker jumped into the breach with *New York*—not all at once, because the magazine took time to develop and succeed, but within a few years he had become the maestro of the postwar, urban, moneyed middle class. He gave the new class what it wanted. It danced to his tune.

Providing a guide to the vagaries of status and money in New York was *New York*'s central driving force all along, but it became more explicit with the passing years. The magazine's first issue hit the stands on April 1, 1968, not yet fully defined. It was vaguely left-wing—there were stories on Ho Chi Minh by Gloria Steinem and on rich commuters riding through Harlem by Jimmy Breslin. At the same time, there was a gossip column, lengthy entertainment listings, a fashion article called "The New Nude Look." Over the first few months *New York* showed a fascination with New York and with the tides of fashion, but also with life in the ghetto, which led to a strangely schizophrenic editorial mood. There was a special issue for Martin Luther King's death and a special issue called "Blueprint for Revolution" (with a huge fist on the cover)—but all this ran alongside stories on Nelson Rockefeller's townhouse, on New York's most expensive apartments, on how it was possible to go broke on $80,000 a year.

'Money, Blood, Intelligence, Drive'

With time, unsurprisingly, the ghetto-revolution side of the magazine faded, to be replaced by straight political coverage. The name writers wrote infrequently. Leafing through early back issues, what sticks in the mind is the magazine's innovative and engaging graphics by Milton Glaser—cartoons, blown-up quotes, flashy headlines, even comic strips, anything to get you to read it—and articles like these: "Wall Street's New Way to Make Money"; "The Power Game: The Only Game in Town"; "How *The New York Times* Covers the Beautiful People" (this with a cover shot of a naked girl wrapped in a *Times*); "Playing the Celebrity Lunch Game"; and most status-anxious of all, "How Not to Be Humiliated in Snob Restaurants." Perhaps the archetypal piece was a gushy profile of Carter and Amanda Burden (tragic irony, in light of the events of this year), by

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1945 Oneida ad

Julie Baumgold, which said Carter Burden was blessed with "a kind of fabulous side order of style, piled on the money, blood, intelligence, decency, and drive." This was not undying stuff—the magazine published very little that was undying, perhaps only Tom Wolfe's "Radical Chic"—but it was the status news of the moment, presented in nakeder form than could be found in any comparable magazine. Circulation, which began at 100,000, was up to 232,000 by the end of two years, and above 300,000 after four.

In the meantime, *New York* was developing another side. In that first summer, 1968, *New York*'s managing editor, Jack Nessel, was looking for a new apartment. He found the process sufficiently difficult and interesting to merit an article—"The Great Apartment Grope," by Nicholas Pileggi. "The result," Felker wrote later, "was overwhelming. It hit the readers right where they lived. Suddenly it became apparent to all of us that writing about the day-to-day life of our readers was the way we could most usefully serve them." *New York* started a Passionate Shopper column, an Urban Strategist column, and a Sales and Bargains column, which joined two existing restaurant columns and a miscellaneous-consumption column called Best Bets. In its third year, *New York* started to print pull-out handbooks—consumer guides on skiing, summer houses, private schools, gardening, all the things the new middle class now had the money to think about. It was telling its readers, in great and explicit detail, how to spend their money on consumer luxuries (some expensive, some cheap, all hip), and it was clear, given the rest of the magazine's contents, that this information was related to the issues of class and status.

It was just as the consumer side of the magazine was reaching full flower that Richard Reeves joined *New York* as its chief political writer. In the fall of 1971 Reeves was working for *The New York Times* but was dissatisfied with daily journalism; Felker had made him several offers, but he had held off. Then one day he looked out his window and saw a huge crowd gathered around a sleepy neighborhood restaurant across the street called The Front Porch. People were lined up around the block to get in. Reeves couldn't figure out what was going on, until he saw that week's *New York*—The Front Porch had been recommended in The Underground Gourmet. "I wrote him a note," Reeves says. "I said, 'You've ruined my goddamn neighborhood.' We had lunch."

Reeves began to be part of the planning process of the magazine, which he describes like this: "Clay would do two things. What he'd personally do is, he loved to entertain, to socialize, to be out all the time. He doesn't like being alone. He listens a lot. Then on Mondays, we'd all go to lunch and have an editorial conference. People would sit around—Clay would be writing on a yellow legal pad—and talk about what was going on. They'd fight and scream and laugh a lot. Out of that would come a group of ideas.

"The only people we worried

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about were the *Times* and the weeklies. We could figure out what they'd do, and then think, 'How do we get out ahead?' One time somebody came in and said men were going to be wearing high-heel shoes. Somebody had been in Rome and seen it. I thought it was insane, but I'll be goddamned if six months later men weren't wearing high heels."

'What Do You Know?'

This was Felker's quest—to find out what was absolutely new, and write about it. It was an instinctual, undefined process, but very important. Last March, when Reeves called Felker from Florida and told him Jimmy Carter was going to be President, Felker ripped up an issue to make room for the story. All the time, he'd call Reeves long-distance in the middle of the night, asking nervously, "What's happening down there, what do you hear, what's going on?" Felker's celebrated East Side-Hamptons-screenings lifestyle was carried on, Reeves says, out of fear of missing anything: "The Hamptons? Shit, Clay Felker doesn't know from beauty. Private screenings? It's all for stories. He's afraid he'll miss another 'Rocky.' I went with him to the screening of 'Rocky,' and when it was over I said to him, 'What did you think of the movie?' 'This guy's really going places,' he said."

New York certainly didn't miss much that was happening—over the years it caught on to hundreds of clothing trends, neighborhood trends, political trends, decorating trends, financial trends. Felker had a particular genius for this that enabled him, to choose one example, to figure out that Edward C. Banfield's *The Unheavenly City* was a hot book; to buy the rights; to overcome the book's academic dryness with jazzy graphics and an introduction about how it was all anybody at Harvard talked about; and not to worry about printing Banfield's right-wing theories side by side with all the blueprints for revolution. (Similarly, it was in the nature of *New York* that it published more articles about feminism and more scantily clad models on the cover than any magazine of its kind.)

A lot of the trends were psychological things, hard to write about, in which case Felker and his writers just winged it. Articles would proclaim that psychiatrists were sleeping with female patients, that working-class lovers were In on the East Side, that adultery could save your marriage, and would then go on to make their staggeringly thin cases with three or four anonymous case histories—most likely, one imagined, of the writer and his friends. Nonetheless, this was what was happening, and so, in the Felker formulation, it had to be written about. "We had to make a decision," he says, "between going to our readers and getting officially accepted." Needless to say, they gave up on being officially accepted, and with good reason, they weren't.

Which is not to say they weren't imitated. Virtually all of the more than 70 city magazines in America became to some degree copies of *New York*. Column ideas, graphics, even specific stories (like the one listing people's salaries) were stolen. *The Washingtonian*, for instance, ran on its cover in October 1967, before *New York*, a photograph of two storks to go with an ode to the Eastern Shore of Maryland. In April 1975, after *New York*, *The Washingtonian*'s cover had a photograph of Sally Quinn's cleavage, over which was superimposed this headline: "The New Society: Power and Media Are In; Money and Manners Are Out."

Non-city magazines are copying Felker, too. So is TV. So are newspapers. *The New York Times*, which once panned a play by saying that only the kind of people who read *New York* would like it, has for financial reasons started two new sections, "Weekend" and "Living." Both are almost meticulous copies of the Felker formula, written in part by former Felker writers. *Times* circula-

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

Diana H. Walker

Clay Felker

tion zooms on the days they are published. Felker has invented a formula that appears to guarantee magazines and newspapers financial success, and thus to make possible a broadened forum for good writing and reporting (as well, as is often the case, as a broadened forum for junk).

Slightly Out of Reach

At the heart of the formula is money, and Felker's central inspiration was figuring out that subscribers to general interest magazines (where the typical article of yore, he says, was "Whither France?") want to read about it, not be shielded from it. Power, too: a good summary of *New York*'s content was this line, which appeared on the table of contents page as a description of the New York Intelligencer column: "This week's compendium of things that the people in power are talking about."

Both are related, in a way, because both are slightly farther out of the reach of *New York* readers than the readers would like them to be. The median household income of *New York* readers is $19,791, which, for the 25-49 age group of which *New York* is the absolute king, is hardly enough to pay for the endless array of summer houses, brass beds, private schools, and wine cellars that parade through *New York*'s pages. On the other hand, nobody can afford everything that's advertised in *The New Yorker* either; all Felker did was transfer the ad content of *The New Yorker* onto his own editorial pages. By having done that, *New York* may provide its readers with a useful service, but it also makes them feel corresponding pangs of insecurity at being confronted every week with pictures of apartments better-looking than their own and by nuances in chic they haven't yet caught on to.

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New York's relationship with that insecurity is a curious blend of sympathy and exacerbation. It certainly understands that its readers are confused; that in their leisure time they don't want to escape money, but to spend it; and that there's never enough. These concerns are pervasive enough, in fact, to blot out the rest of the world completely; from reading *New York* magazine one gets the impression that the postwar meritocratic elite is so worried about its own strivings for status that it thinks about little else.

Before the war, the world of chic was remote enough to be the object only of fascination. One could listen to Walter Winchell describing the scene at the Stork Club without ever imagining that one could be part of that scene oneself. Once that became possible, one had to confront a whole new set of worries: what food to order once inside the Stork Club (or, in modern times, Elaine's), what wine to drink, what to talk about. Chic became an object of neurosis, an all-consuming end in itself, measurable largely in terms of patterns of owning and spending. Thus can Felker say, in all seriousness, "When we wrote about going broke on $80,000 a year, people thought we were kidding. But that dramatized the dilemma of modern urban society. It's a very serious problem: the modern middle-class parent has so many demands, he can't make it on $80,000. The symbols of affluence suddenly became necessities. People talk about a revolution of rising expectations—well, that's not just going on in the Third World. It's here, too, and just as explosive."

'The Best Out of Life'

Felker's and, presumably, his readers' belief that these are the real dilemmas a magazine should confront has garnered *New York* and its imitators plenty of criticism. Jimmy Breslin quit *New York*, calling it "boutique journalism." Nora Ephron quit *New York*, and said city magazines "have taken food and home furnishings and plant care and surrounded them with just enough political and sociological reporting to give readers an excuse to buy them." When *The Washingtonian* sent out a subscription appeal saying, "Admittedly, *The Washingtonian* isn't for everyone. . . . This magazine is written for intelligent people. . . individuals who want and get the best out of life whether it's a walk along the Canal or a Mercedes," William Raspberry, a black columnist for *The Washington Post*, wrote an acerbic I-cancel-my-subscription column, causing *The Washingtonian*'s wounded editor to go off on a two-month leave of absence to lick his wounds.

It's all true enough: Felker journalism has no great concern (any more, at least) for the problems of anyone but its readers. In that respect, it's a reflection of the mood of the veterans coming back from World War II—the same lack of causes persists, shaped and fueled over the years by the money that the economy and the G.I. Bill brought. That money, existing as it did in an ideological vacuum, came to assume a disproportionate importance. It became a cause in itself and a measure of how successfully one had negotiated one's period of upward mobility.

Thirty years later, the veterans and their children are living in the world that city magazines have captured, where there's never enough money, where one is surrounded by a bewildering array of new, incomprehensible products and fashions, where apartments are always too shabby and salaries always too low. The only consolation—their precarious perch, at least, on the breaking wave of style—threatens to evaporate if next week's *New York* doesn't come or if a new trend is missed. They are the not particularly happy society the war created, a society that fought Hitler and came back weary and victorious, and that now—as the twig bends—is left with no sustaining guidepost as strong as consumption. ■

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There's Poetry in Spying, and Spying in Poetry

by Brock Brower

There is a theory around that a lot of spies are disappointed literati. E. Howard Hunt writes trash, and James J. Angleton once helped Reed Whittemore edit a small poetry magazine called *Furioso*. There is even a corollary to this theory which says that a certain elitist taste in literature is a likely indicator of overzealousness. If an agent accepts the aesthetics of Pound and Eliot, he must inevitably swallow their politics, and that ends him up a semi-fascist, organizing covert efforts to preserve the power structure against revolutionary elements, for very nasty reasons. Out of *The Wasteland* and the *Pisan Cantos* comes COINTELPRO.

The theory and particularly its corollary seem to me pretty bogus. After all, how many readers of Walt Whitman inevitably become male nurses during wartime? But it does strike me that spies and writers, especially poets, do have something curious, even surreptitious, in common. Perhaps it's their willingness to employ any ruse, don any disguise, to get at all our dirty little secrets. W. H. Auden, for instance, could never resist reading other people's mail, and what is a poet's persona but a polite term for his cover? A much deeper psychological profile needs to be drawn of the black operator in either craft. Maybe, for a start, from the rich intelligence haul contained in John Hollander's *Reflections on Espionage**, a closely held 1976 report on the clandestine mind, encoded as a supremely artful poem itself.

Basically the book is one long intercept of the messages from a master-spy code-named Cupcake, who, says Hollander, "worked for an altogether inconvenient little republic which ceased to exist a good time ago." During his career underground, Cupcake communicated incessantly by wireless in what gives every outward sign of being stanza form. The stanzas, however, have dates and destined receivers—6/10 (TO IMAGE), 6/15 (TO BUN), 6/16 (TO GRUSHA) —and went out often on secret, higher frequencies that Cupcake believed were available only to himself and, for

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*Atheneum, 1976.

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example, IMAGE. Regrettably for Cupcake, his control, Lyrebird, overheard all. But profitably for the profession—either profession—the whole record has now been deciphered to expose the secret dictates of art that underlie the secret lore of spying. Or, just as true, vice versa.

Take, for instance, Cupcake's code:

That code itself, the purest form
of language,
Thrills the enciphering mind;
putting the plain
Sense into travelling garb is a kind of
Singing. And until They
change the codebook, my
Eleven seems a kind of measure fit for
Reaches of feeling as wide as
any mode's . . . .

In other words—putting the above "in clear," as spies say—the spy's code is the poet's metric, and Cupcake's choice is the hendecasyllabic. It has eleven beats instead of the standard ten beats of the heroic English line, and subtly allows a poet, i. e., Catullus, to delve deeply into secret human emotions. If iambic pentameter is martially dot-DASH, dot-DASH, dot-DASH, dot-DASH, dot-DASH, the hendecasyllabic adds just that one more sneaky dot or DASH. The extra stressed or unstressed syllable gives a kind of breathless rush to whatever Cupcake is trying to communicate, either aphoristically:

A clearly-broken, gaily emptied egg is
All that the golden word omelette
can mean.

Or lyrically:

Their beauty, the ciphers?
O, I suppose we have been left with
that, too,
Harmless as a kind of humming
while we work.

The ultimate effect is one of loquacity, the intense effort to say all, to inform the world, out of the lonely isolation of the spy's cover. Cupcake's "eleven-phase transposition grid" becomes the poetic rubric for his abiding despair. The meter, like any code, is a large part of the total intrigue.

Or take Cupcake's fellow agents. There are less important, barely identifiable assets in his ambiguous network, named Felucca, The Foot, Thumbtack, Allen Aspirin, et. al. But his major contacts are with such spies as Ember and Lac, who, in turn, bear very marked resemblance to some leading poets of our day:

I saw Ember today at the Museum . . .
How he has risen
From the ashes of himself! I recall
His former crabbed privacies, his sad,
fussy
Insistence on obscure French
restaurants at
Noon for passing messages,
the bizarre keys
For ciphers he would invent.

Now he seems an
Illumination of the ordinary . . . .
. . . as if his work were of the
wide world,
That "universal and public
manuscript."

This is an encoded tribute to the poet John Ashberry, just as what appears earlier, as an incidental report, is a bleaker message of regret for the fate of Robert Lowell, nicknamed "Cal," which read backwards would be

Lac grows daily more tiresome;
Funding him by now must be an
enormous
Burden for whomever is running him,
and
What he brings in will never be
any good.
He seems obsessed with his place
in histories
Of intelligence.

And finally there is Cupcake himself, for whom—going "in clear" again—let Hollander be overtly praised. He begins as a master-spy and something of a poetaster, but gradually grows into a blown asset and a near-great lyricist. The burden of the poem—and Hollander's statement about the world of spying—is the fashion in which

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Cupcake is transformed into a kind of ultimate cipher for the secret human condition.

This happens doubly, as all things should in the realm of espionage. As a spy, Cupcake becomes a mere cipher, a naught in the collapse of his network around him. But as the communicator—the agent sending forth his messages—Cupcake offers us the final cipher, the key to how human loneliness—all the cut-outs and dead-letter drops and spies' lies we each daily employ—can be decoded.

On 9/30, Cupcake sends out a message with "Outstretched arms. Here, then, this, on all frequencies." The line leaps from eleven to thirteen syllables, sending forth an open, almost Keatsian plea that

Breath
Enwraps no messages,
but of its aeromancy
There are no end of forms which,
enciphered in twilight,
Are decoded in the blue
morning air . . . .

But the same transmission contains another secret message, which can be found by reading down the outsides of the stanza, through the first and thirteenth syllables that have been added. It cries out, "O STOP ME CUPCAKE."

Lyrebird hears, and the last line of the poem goes out from Lyrebird to all frequencies.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

On its face, it indicates death, an X-ing out, but beyond that, the Xs are the indices to another code (provided in the notes to the poem by Hollander) that spells out "TERMINATE CUPCAKE."

But Cupcake, of course, can no longer really be terminated. He is now central to Hollander's *Reflections*, the main cipher to Hollander's intricately transmitted intelligence about the world of spying, about a peculiar network the assets of which were

Notional characters, thinner than
fictions,
Yet fully formed on these pages
they dwell in.

That too is Cupcake's fate. He is on the page, come in from the cold, and in his moment of greatest loss—his disappearance forever from the air—we can believe perhaps that he only regretted he had but one notional life to give for whatever country his was.■

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

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

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Blind Ambition in the White House

by Charles Peters

*Blind Ambition** is John Dean's story as told by Taylor Branch, a former editor of this magazine and of *Harper's* and now Washington correspondent for *Esquire*. Rarely does a ghost-written book attain distinction, but in the case of *Blind Ambition*, the combination of Branch's narrative skill and Dean's remarkable memory has produced a work of genuine merit.

Just as there is a culture of the bureaucracy and a culture of the Congress, there is a culture of the White House—and *Blind Ambition* is the best book that has been written about it since George Reedy's *Twilight of the Presidency*. While its personae are a unique mixture of Jaycees and SS, the daily pressures it describes at the White House during Watergate still exist under Carter and almost certainly will continue to influence administrations to come.

When John Dean became White House counsel, he found that his new job required him to do little. This is not an uncommon experience for government workers. They usually react by stuffing their briefcases with newspapers and paperback novels to help pass the time. If there is a danger that a supervisor will notice they have nothing to do, attention will be paid to creating the appearance of activity. This is true of those in the middle and lower rungs of the bureaucracy who have risen as far as they think they can or want to go and whose main goal has become bureaucratic survival.

Things are different at the top, however. In the White House and at the higher levels of the executive agencies, ambition for power is the main motivation. There's considerable risk-taking in this world. Indeed, risk-taking is inevitable, because you're swimming in a sea of sharks. Aggression is not merely a desirable trait, it is indispensable. So when John Dean found he didn't have much to do, he called in his new assistant, Fred Fielding, and told him:

" 'Fred, I think we have to look at our office as a small law firm at the White House. We have to build our practice like any other law firm. Our principal client, of course, is the President. But to convince the President we're not just the only law office in town but the best, we've got to convince a lot of other people first. Haldeman, Ehrlichman and the others

*Simon and Schuster, 1976.

Charles Peters is editor-in-chief of The Washington Monthly.

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who surround the President. Here's how we can do it.'

"Our conflict-of-interest duties were the key, I explained. The work was complicated and boring, but I had already sensed that it would produce new business. 'It seems that when you really get to know a man's personal financial situation,' I said, 'and then candidly discuss his job here to determine if he has any conflicts, you can end up in his confidence if you play it right. And once you're in his confidence, he sends you business.' "

What a Tangled Web We Weave

In building this practice, Dean took his first steps down the road to Watergate:

"It did not take long to notice that the counsel's office could perform intelligence work for the White House. We had already assumed the role in our conflict-of-interest investigations. And we had Jack Caulfield, who knew such waters. We advertised our office as the place where questions would be answered. I encouraged this new specialty, figuring that intelligence would be more valued by the policy-makers than would dry legal advice."

Dean's political intelligence work took him, in January 1972, to John Mitchell's office, where he watched Gordon Liddy give his flip-chart presentation of his plans for spying on the Democrats, featuring among other things floating call girls at the Democratic convention.

John Dean would not have been at that meeting had he not gotten involved in intelligence work. He would not have gotten into intelligence if he had not felt he had to expand his role at the White House. It was thus the culture of the White House that put the pressure on John Dean to expand the business of the counsel's office, and it was the character of John Dean that determined what he would do in response to that pressure.

Just as Vietnam was less the product of American imperialism than of the culture of our military and foreign affairs bureaucracies interacting with the character of Lyndon Johnson and the character of Richard Nixon, Watergate was the product of the character of Richard Nixon and the character of his key subordinates reacting to pressures that are a continuing part of the culture of the White House. Culture determines the pressures, character determines the response. The responses of the Nixon crew were generally grotesque. But the pressures were typical of life at the White House.

Back to Mitchell's office. Liddy's proposal strikes everyone as extreme. It seems doomed. But what comes to its rescue? Again it's the culture of the White House. More particularly it's Bob Haldeman's tickler, his method for making sure assignments are not forgotten. To understand how the tickler helped resurrect Liddy's plan, you must understand how the tickler worked. Dean explains:

"The discipline of Haldeman's tickler was unrelenting. I had felt it with my first assignment, with its due date 'Wednesday, August 5, 1970, at 2:00 p.m.' That one I had answered on time, but subsequently I spent too much time preparing my answers to a few action memoranda, let the due dates slide by, and discovered the consequences. First a secretary in the staff secretary's office called my secretary, asking where the answer was, and when the explanation was found unsatisfactory a very bitchy Larry Higby called to say, 'What's the matter, Dean, can't you meet a deadline? Do you think you're someone special?' When I explained I was working on the response, Higby snapped, 'Work a little harder.' Higby was chewed out by Haldeman when the paper did not flow as the chief of staff wanted, so he leaned on others.

"Once a staff man was nailed with responsibility for the slightest project, the tickler would keep pestering until it was fed something: a status report, a piece of paper, a bit of information to chew on. No one could ignore the tickler, because no one could afford

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to ignore Haldeman. It reached everywhere. Even Mitchell and Kissinger were subject to it. Each call was recorded meticulously on the tickler scorecard, on which reputations were made and broken in Haldeman's eyes."

The tickler continued to whir along even as the ship was going down and the crew was beginning to gurgle:

"Even during the strain of my first week of meetings with the [Watergate] prosecutors, the chaos of normal White House business continued. Although I had all but relinquished my title to Fielding because of Watergate pressure, official calls kept coming to me. One of them pushed me over the edge, causing me to buck the tickler for the first time. Higby called on the I.O. [inter-office phone], 'John, what's the latest report on the replacement for the *Sequoia*?'

" 'You're putting me on, Larry!'

" 'No, I'm not,' he said testily. 'I need a report.'

"For nine months the tickler had been after me to find a replacement for the President's yacht. He had become bored with the *Sequoia*, finding all kinds of faults with it. I had sent aides to obtain blueprints of the best yachts in the world, and several White House offices had spent months going through them in detail, searching for a boat that would satisfy the President's whims. Then there had been discussions with the owners as we bargained to find someone who would donate his yacht for the prestige and the tax write-off.

" 'Larry, I've turned this damn project over to Kalmbach,' I said impulsively. 'I don't have any goddam idea what he's doing, and I really don't care.'

" 'You want me to tell *Bob* that?' Higby gasped, as if a priest had just threatened to spit on the Bible.

" 'Tell him whatever you want.' I hung up, feeling better. The White House is insane, I thought."

But for Watergate, the important thing is that the tickler was still going strong in the spring of 1972. Haldeman's assistant, Gordon Strachan, kept asking Magruder: "What are you doing about getting intelligence on the Democrats?" And another cultural factor came into play: fear of the other guy taking over one's turf. Here's Magruder explaining to Dean:

" 'Well, yeah, after that second meeting [in which Liddy pushed for approval of a modified intelligence-gathering plan], I felt I had to bring it up with Mitchell again because Colson was just pushing me like mad. He kept calling me and asking what's going on. So I went to Mitchell and I told him. I said, "Listen, if we don't take care of this, Colson's going to take it over!" '

Jealous and Leery

" 'That explains it,' [Dean] thought. Everything that had happened since the February 4 meeting was falling into place. Magruder had been pressured by Colson in addition to Haldeman's tickler. He knew Mitchell was jealous and leery of Colson, so he had pushed Mitchell's 'Colson button.'

And here's Dean talking to Mitchell:

" 'Well, I have had a lot of theories,' I began. 'My strongest one is that Colson was all over you on the Liddy plan, and Haldeman was sending down pressure through Strachan. I know you weren't too excited about it, but I figure you finally said what the hell and approved it to get them off your back. My theory is that you just threw the dice on it.'

"Mitchell turned to look at me for the first time. He was holding his pipe in his hand, leaning slightly forward in his chair. 'Your theory is right,' he said quietly, 'except we thought it would be one or two times removed from the Committee.' "

Culture was equally important in dictating the cover-up. It would have been possible to resist Hunt's blackmail if all Hunt could tell was the story of the Watergate burglary. There he had direct evidence on no one

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higher than Liddy. But he knew something else: He knew about Ehrlichman's responsibility for the Ellsberg break-in. And the Ellsberg break-in was another cultural event. Indeed, there is no better example of the influence of culture than the Ellsberg case.

From a political standpoint, the Pentagon Papers presented Nixon with a marvelous opportunity to blame the war on the Democrats. But in the culture of the White House, there is no greater sin than leaking and no greater sinner than the leaker. Instead of condemning the Democrats for getting us into an impossible war, Nixon had to condemn Ellsberg. In so doing, Nixon obeyed the cultural imperative.

Carter Is Better

The pressures at the White House remain the same. Leaking continues to be a sin. The real reason Greg Schneiders lost his job as Carter's appointments secretary is that he was a leaker. But presidential character makes a difference in the nature of the response. While Nixon hounded Ellsberg to the point of ordering both the break-in and criminal prosecution, Carter, having punished Schneiders, picked him from the floor, dusted him off, and gave him another, if less influential, White House job.

So Carter is better than Nixon. Still, if his response is less vicious, more merciful, he's responding blindly to the same pressures. Carter needs to learn to understand the various cultures of the government, so that he can anticipate their influences and avoid them when they aren't in the public interest. Although Johnson and Ford knew the Congress well, we have not had a President since Eisenhower who understood anything about the culture of the executive branch. While Eisenhower understood only the military, that was enough to keep us out of war for eight years, which is an indication that the subject is not unimportant.

The best-known characteristic of the culture of the White House is its tendency to produce yes men—men who will click their heels and salute in obedience to the tickler no matter what it tells them to do. Many people feel this tendency is so strong that it is inescapable—and without doubt it very nearly is. That is why it is so important for a President to signal with the greatest clarity that he wants no men, men who will tell him when they think he's doing wrong and who will resign and tell the world if he continues to do wrong. Instead of repudiating the first dissenter who turns out to be right, as Kennedy did with Chester Bowles after Bowles said no to the Bay of Pigs, Carter should heap honor upon him.

As we have pointed out before, Carter's experiences in the Navy and running his own small business successfully without a staff are not the sort of thing that teaches a man to value dissent. Neither does his religion.

The scriptures, while edifying in most respects, are a dismal guide to sound public administration. The leader is always right; the staff is always wrong. As dissenters, the disciples are a bunch of turkeys. Andrew says the five loaves and two fish aren't enough to feed the multitude. Peter doubts that his belief can make him walk on water. The dissenters are "ye of little faith." The boss, Jesus, is never wrong.

Perhaps there should be a public subscription to purchase for the President the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* and the two-volume set of *The Complete Greek Dramas*. These splendid works, while perhaps otherwise inferior to the scriptures as spiritual guidance, are full of Cassandras, seers, and priestesses who tell the hero, "Don't do that or there's going to be trouble," and turn out to be absolutely right.

If we must remain doubtful that Carter will act to encourage dissent, we can at least have hope that he will do something about the problem John Dean found when he entered upon his

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duties at the White House only to find that those duties involved very little real work. Carter has already announced that he plans to cut back on staff in the White House as well as throughout the executive branch.

The Devil's Workshop

When there is not enough real work to do in the White House, mischief is the likely result. Remember that the search for work and the competition for available assignments were at least partially responsible for Dean's original involvement in Watergate and for Mitchell's and Magruder's reluctant approval of Liddy's espionage plan.

Already things have reached the point at the Carter White House where Evans and Novak are quoting a member of the staff as saying his colleagues are sitting with their backs against the wall at meetings so that they will at least be able to see the knives of their associates. Many people feel this sort of thing is inevitable at the White House, just as they feel certain the place will always be full of yes men.

But I think it's possible to minimize—although I agree it's impossible to eliminate completely—the vicious backbiting that has seemed constant among those who work in the White House. The secret is not to hire people to fill slots, as John Dean was hired to be special counsel to the President, but only to hire people when you have enough real work to keep them busy. As one who has spent roughly half his Washington years in the government and the other half in an understaffed enterprise, I can say the difference is dramatic. If people are overworked, they do not reach out and try to steal more work from their associates. One hears the piteous moans of the weary around this magazine, but never the jealous, competitive verbal stab in the back.

In the executive branch as a whole, a central problem is that people are hired to fill slots like Special Counsel to the President or Director of Albanian Moth Control. When a vacancy occurs, it is rare that the person with hiring authority asks whether there is a real need for the job. As happens all too often, the position of special counsel had originally been created to sound like a nice title for someone the White House was really depriving of all power and function; and Albanian moth control, while once a vitally important matter is, due to the demise of all Albanian moths, no longer a pressing public concern.

Instead of imposing arbitrary ceilings on White House and other government employment, Carter should ask what work really needs doing, reassign present employees to do that work, fire the rest, and hire new ones only to the extent they are needed to do real work. This would be the greatest revolution in bureaucratic history, and, if it comes to pass, we can only hope there is no eternal life, for if there is, Chairman Mao will be forever wondering, in the hereafter, "Why didn't *I* think of that?" ■

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

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The Brothers Reuther. Victor G. Reuther. Houghton Mifflin.

Campaign Money: Reform and Reality in the States. Herbert E. Alexander, ed. Free Press.

The Case Against the Reckless Congress. Marjorie Holt, ed. Green Hill.

The Changing American Voter. Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba, John R. Petrocik. Harvard Univ.

Chief Counsel: Inside the Ervin Committee—The Untold Story of Watergate. Samuel Dash. Random House.

The Children's Cause. Gilbert Y. Steiner. Brookings.

Cleaning Up America. John Quarles. Houghton Mifflin.

Cointelpro: The FBI's Secret War on Political Freedom. Nelson Blackstock. Vintage.

The Collapse of Western Civilization. Frederick K. Huntington-Vigman. Christopher Publishing House.

The Coming Breakpoint. Barry Goldwater. Macmillan.

The Committee of One Million: "China Lobby" Politics, 1953-1971. Stanley D. Bachrack. Columbia Univ.

The Conscience of a Young Conservative. Donald Lambro. Arlington House.

The Creative Balance: Government, Politics, and the Individual in America's Third Century. Elliot Richardson. Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

The Democrats: The Years After FDR. Herbert S. Parmet. Macmillan.

Democratic Promise: The Populist Movement in America. Lawrence Goodwyn. Oxford.

Detente and Defense. Robert J. Pranger, ed. American Enterprise Institute.

Disaster by Decree: The Supreme Court Decisions on Race and the Schools. Lino A. Graglia. Cornell Univ.

The Dynamics of Detente: How to End the Arms Race. Arthur Macy Cox. Norton.

The Electronic Battlefield. Paul Dickson. Indiana Univ.

The End of French Predominance in Europe. Stephan A. Schuker. Univ. of North Carolina.

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

JBLISHERS FOR THE ANNUAL POLITICAL BOOK AWARD

The First Amendment and the Future of American Democracy. Walter Berns. Basic.

Friendly Fire. C. D. B. Bryan. Putnam.

Full Faith and Credit: The Story of C.I.T. Financial Corporation. William L. Wilson. Random House.

The Futile System. John J. Rhodes. EPM.

The Gods of Antenna. Bruce Herschensohn. Arlington House.

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Henry Wallace, Harry Truman, and the Cold War. Richard J. Walton. Viking.

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"I Never Wanted To Be Vice-President **of** Anything!"**: An Investigative Biography of Nelson Rockefeller.** Michael Kramer, Sam Roberts. Basic.

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Ideology and Utopia in the United States: 1956-1976. Irving Louis Horowitz. Oxford.

The Impending Crisis. David M. Potter. Harper & Row.

In Defense of the Public Liberty. Samuel B. Griffith II. Doubleday.

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The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa. Mohamed A. El-Khawas, Barry Cohen, eds. Lawrence Hill.

The Last Kennedy: Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts, Before and After Chappaquiddick. Robert Sherrill. Dial.

The Lawless State: The Crime of the U.S. Intelligence Agencies. Morton H. Halperin, Jerry J. Berman, Robert L. Borosage, Christine M. Marwick. Penquin.

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Men Against McCarthy. Richard M. Fried. Columbia Univ.

My Mind on Trial. Eugen Loebl. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

The Natural Superiority of Southern Politicians. David Leon Chandler. Doubleday.

Neighborhood Organization and Interest-Group Processes. David J. O'Brien. Princeton.

Nightmare: The Underside of the Nixon Years. J. Anthony Lukas. Viking.

Nimitz. E.B. Potter. U.S. Naval Institute.

No Thank You, Mr. President. John Herbers. Norton.

Norman Thomas: The Last Idealist. W.A. Swanberg. Scribners.

The Occupational Safety and Health Act. Robert Stewart Smith. American Enterprise Institute.

On the Psychology of Military Incompetence. Norman F. Dixon. Basic.

The 103rd Ballot. Robert K. Murray. Harper & Row.

Organizing the Presidency. Stephan Hess. Brookings.

An Over-Governed Society. W. Allen Wallis. Free Press.

The Participatory Bureaucracy: Women and Minorities in a More Representative Public Service. Harry Kranz. Lexington.

Party Dynamics. Richard L. Rubin. Oxford.

Party Leadership in the States. Robert J. Huckshorn. Univ. of Massachusetts.

A Peace Denied: The United States, Vietnam, and the Paris Peace Agreement. Gareth Porter. Indiana Univ.

The People's Guide to Campaign Politics. Gary Robert Schwedes. People's Lobby Press.

Political Profiles: The Johnson Years. Nelson Lichtenstein, ed. Facts on File.

Political Profiles: The Kennedy Years. Nelson Lichtenstein, ed. Facts on File.

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The Politics of Exclusion. Michael N. Danielson. Columbia Univ.

The Poverty of Power. Barry Commoner. Knopf.

The Power to Probe. James Hamilton. Random House.

The President Speaks Off-The-Record. Harold Brayman. Dow Jones.

Presidential Style. Samuel and Dorothy Rosenman. Harper & Row.

The Promise of Greatness: The Social Programs of the Last Decade and Their Major Achievements. Sar A. Levitan, Robert Taggart. Harvard.

Pursuing The American Dream: White Ethnics and the New Populism. Richard Krickus. Indiana Univ.

The Raid. Benjamin F. Schemmer. Harper & Row.

The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory. Richard J. Bernstein. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Remaking Foreign Policy. Graham Allison, Peter Szanton. Basic.

The Rockefellers: An American Dynasty. Peter Collier and David Horowitz. Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Roger Baldwin. Peggy Lamson. Houghton Mifflin.

The Role of the Supreme Court in American Government. Archibald Cox. Oxford.

Roosevelt and Churchill, 1939-1941. Joseph P. Lash. Norton.

Running For President: A Journal of the Carter Campaign. Martin Schram. Pocket.

Scoundrel Time. Lillian Hellman. Little Brown.

Secrets, Spies and Scholars. Ray S. Cline. Acropolis.

The Shadow Government. Daniel Guttman, Barry Willner. Pantheon.

Simple Justice. Richard Kluger. Knopf.

Soviet Foreign Policy, 1962-1973: The Paradox of Super Power. Robin Edwards. Oxford.

Southern Governors and Civil Rights: Racial Segregation as a Campaign Issue in the Second Reconstruction. Earl Black. Harvard Univ.

Squeaking By: U.S. Energy Policy Since the Embargo. Richard B. Mancke. Columbia Univ.

Taming the Giant Corporation. Ralph Nader, Mark Green, Joel Seligman. Norton.

The "Tar Baby" Option: American Policy Toward Southern Rhodesia. Anthony Lake. Columbia Univ.

The Tides of Power: Conversations on the American Constitution. Bob Eckhardt, Charles L. Black, Jr. Yale Univ.

The Time of Illusion. Jonathan Schell. Knopf.

To Jerusalem and Back. Saul Bellow. Viking.

Today and Tomorrow in America. Martin Mayer. Harper & Row.

Too Little But Not Too Late. Sar A. Levitan, Joyce K. Zickler. Lexington.

Toward a Planned Society: From Roosevelt to Nixon. Otis L. Graham, Jr. Oxford.

The Transformation of Southern Politics. Jack Bass, Walter DeVries. Basic.

Unchosen Presidents. Allan P. Sindler. Univ. of California.

Unequal Justice. Jerold S. Auerbach. Oxford.

United States Foreign Policy and World Order. James Nathan, James Oliver. Little, Brown.

The Vanishing Congress—Where Has All The Power Gone? David J. Muchow. North American International.

Vertical Integration in the Oil Industry. Edward J. Mitchell, ed. American Enterprise Institute.

The Wall of Separation: The Constitutional Politics of Church and State. Frank J. Sorauf. Princeton Univ.

The War That Never Was: An Insider's Account of CIA Covert Operations Against Cuba. Bradley Earl Ayers. Bobbs-Merril.

Wealth and Want. Stanley Lebergott. Princeton Univ.

Why Not the Best? Jimmy Carter. Broadman.

Worlds of Pain: Life in the Working-Class Family. Lillian Breslow Rubin. Basic.

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the political puzzle

by John Barclay



ACROSS

1. Prompt White House
& 5. action rescatters many all around. (7,7)
9. Make little crepe mixture in fruit. (9)
10. Steel inserted for sculptor. (5)
11. Second in contests for modern emissions. (5)
12. Seize upon kind of tool chant. (5,4)
13. Unfair prince? (7)
15. Take leave from tour pod. (4,3)
17. What is assumed in topside confusion. (7)
19. New event on board for justice. (7)
21. Skill, but you can make it peer sex. (9)
23. Tidy up Mr. Lance; he'll come out O.K. (5)
24. Drive on in blimp elevator. (5)
25. City built with labor time. (9)
26. January headline: "up-
& 27. set all or mad events." (7,7)

DOWN

1. Scoundrel state produces its own body. (7)
2. Crisp lube job available in some states. (9)
3. Play seven when the odds are against you. (5)
4. One of NFL's more dependable quarterbacks. (7)
5. Prevented dear vet change. (7)
6. Yankee in Warsaw? (5,4)
7. Vehicle gets around in the Andes. (5)
8. Forcibly remove deranged aunty. O.K.? (4,3)
14. Among others, make it a linear composition. (5,4)
16. Ham it up in messy TV room with ease. (9)
17. Pure 2001 comes through for prize. (7)
18. Rib bled from intricate basketball maneuver. (7)
19. Let lips make word clear! (5,2)
20. Transmitters of Dressen version. (7)
22. Parent on a short visit? (3,2)
23. Dishes in a bunch in Akron. (5)

The numbers indicate the number of letters and words, e.g., (2, 3) means a two-letter word followed by a three-letter word. Groups of letters, e.g., USA, are treated as one word. Answers to last month's puzzle are on *page 15.*

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How the Defense Department Can Save Billions Without Worrying About National Security

by Gregory G. Rushford

Cutting the defense budget is an issue associated with tough choices. It is generally taken to mean eliminating crucial weapons, making the United States a second-rate power, letting the Russians run roughshod over the world. These being the doomsday terms in which defense budget cuts are discussed, it's not surprising that those cuts are hard to achieve; Cassandras are seldom ignored in America.

But more than half of the defense budget—$57 billion of $101 billion—goes to what the Pentagon calls "manpower": paychecks for five million military personnel, reservists, defense civilians, and pensioners. The manpower side of the defense budget can easily be cut by the $5 to $7 billion President Carter campaigned for, without the slightest effect on what even the toughest of hard-liners could construe to be national security precautions. Issues of military strength should be argued, but the Pentagon's personnel overspending is another story altogether.

The 2.1 million military personnel on active duty today are 600,000 fewer—that's 21 per cent— than the total in 1964, but in 1964 payroll took only 47 per cent of the defense budget. Eight per cent of the budget, about $9 billion, now goes to military pensions; that's seven times what pensions cost 12 years ago when they took up 2.4 per cent of the budget. In 25 years, pension costs could go as high as $30 billion annually. Perhaps another $3 billion a year now pays for support personnel who are simply unnecessary. Another $1.7 billion

Gregory Rushford, a former congressional staff aide, is now a Washington writer.

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

keeps the National Guard and Reserves, who are almost completely useless, in inefficient business. More than $2.7 billion every year goes to moving military personnel around at a pace that is not only wasteful, but counter-productive. These are the areas of the defense budget that cry out for close examination.

Unlike 90 per cent of the federal government's civil servants, who contribute seven per cent of their annual salaries to a pension for which they will not be eligible until they have worked 30 years and reached the age of 55, military personnel contribute nothing and may collect full retirement benefits immediately upon completion of 20 years' service while still in their 30s. That means the rest of us pay up to $9 billion each year for military retirement; and the beneficiaries of our largesse are often people at the peak of their performing power, people who are capable of continuing to do good work in the military but instead are paid by the public to retire from the military, often to do their peak performing in civilian jobs.

Congressman Les Aspin recently discovered one chief petty officer who retired in 1976 at age 35. The man had joined the Navy on his seventeenth birthday. By repeatedly taking advantage of Navy regulations that offered enlistment time credit for re-enlisting three months before the end of a normal tour of duty, he became eligible for retirement after serving only 18 years, four months, and 26 days. The petty officer had graduated first in his class at various service schools; he represents precisely the kind of person who should be encouraged to stay in uniform. But to

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stay would have meant forgoing over $156,000 in military pension checks *before* he reached age 65. By that time the man will probably be receiving a second pension from a civilian career.

Only six per cent of those eligible to retire from the military remain after 20 years. If they stay on, they lose money. Why shouldn't they take their pension and get extra income from a civilian job instead of remaining in the military? They would have to be suckers to stay.

Perhaps it made some sense to encourage men in their late thirties to retire in the days when the Army was geared to the cavalry and infantry, where youth makes a significant difference in performance. But there are now over a million military jobs that could be better or just as well filled by men and women in their forties and fifties. Of the 790,200 soldiers in the Army, only 160,000 are combat troops.

If we let only combat personnel retire after 20 years and require everyone else to serve 30 years, we could save $4 billion annually.

Probably $3 billion is wasted every year because of poor management practices and over-bureaucratization in the Defense Department and the services. Examples are nearly everywhere one looks.

The Pentagon itself has been concerned that the $850 million it spends annually for 382 reports to various federal agencies and Congress is far too much. After a two-year effort to reduce these reports, 72 were identified as useless and eliminated. Then the General Accounting Office discovered that 94 new reports had been added during the cutback effort for a net gain of 22 reports. A recent House Appropriations Committee report found that Defense logistics studies are currently being conducted by "24 Defense Department organizations, 93 Army organizations, 39 Air Force, 51 Navy, 2 Defense Supply Agency, 20 other government agencies, and 188 defense contractors." With overlap like that, the committee said, many of the studies are a "total waste."

The Defense Department operates about 90 commercial and industrial military support activities besides shipyards. Although their work forces are predominantly civilian, more than 10,000 military personnel are assigned to these activities as well. The GAO selected one such installation, the Naval Weapons Support Center in Crane, Indiana, for a case study. Crane has 4,500 civilian employees and 68 from the military, of whom 19 are officers and 49 are enlisted men. The installation's work involves explosives

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and ammunition, but the GAO investigators discovered that only 23 of the military personnel were doing official military work. The remaining 45 military men, plus 10 civilians, "were providing support services for the military complement, such as food and housekeeping, recreation, commissary and exchange stores, and health care." The cost of this non-military part of Crane's military personnel budget was $795,000 of a personnel total of $1.2 million. An additional $92,000 went to a commissary that served primarily retired military personnel living in the area. The GAO has recommended reducing the military presence at Crane from 68 to 3, one officer and two enlisted men.

Nobody knows exactly how many hundreds of thousands of people are paid to perform nonessential jobs. Because of congressional pressures the Pentagon has eliminated 18,000 support positions in Europe and replaced them with combat positions. In response to other pressures to reduce unnecessary layers of staff at headquarters the Army has been able to increase its combat divisions from 13 to 16 without adding personnel.

Two hundred fifty thousand civilian employees are listed innocuously in congressional budget books as working on "military morale and welfare activities." These are the people who run ski resorts in Germany, hotels in Hawaii, golf courses wherever there are military officers, and a myriad of other recreational activities worldwide. Nobody can say for sure what it all costs, since the 250,000 employees are under a special "non-appropriated" fund category, but, as one congressional staff member who is investigating the situation says, "To use a quarter of a million people to service a military force of only 2.1 million is outrageous."

If the armed forces are overserviced, they are increasingly overadministered, too. One congressional study points out that while we had one general or admiral for every 5,000

troops during World War II, we now have one for every 1,600 troops. *The Wall Street Journal* reports that "of the 3,682 captains in the Navy, only 336 are assigned to sea duty."

This is not merely a military problem. The Pentagon admits to overstaffing its civilian work force of about one million as well. For reasons largely "unknown," the number of GS-15 and GS-16 (middle management) defense civil servants has nearly doubled since 1961. It's called "grade creep," meaning there have been weak controls by top management because of pressures over the years to create unnecessary jobs. Grade creep wastes at least $1 billion annually.

From Base to Base

About $1.7 billion this year—more than the B-1 bomber appropriations and every other weapons system save the Trident submarine and missile—will be spent just to move servicemen and their families from base to base. Congressman Aspin has calculated that still another $1 billion in hidden costs is associated with these transients and estimates that "on any given day next year, 30,000 of the

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Army's 790,000 men won't be working or assigned to any job because they will be packing, moving, or unpacking."

The turbulence in personnel moves (called PCS, for Permanent Change of Station) has its roots in the old theory that the Army should move its officers from job to job to broaden the experience of potential Chiefs of Staff. But even for future Chiefs of Staff there are often various challenging jobs on the same bases. We would also retain more officers if they did not have to put their families through the trouble of nearly annual moves. One calculation estimates savings of $250 million next year if the average tour of duty in one place were lengthened just from 14 to 18 months.

Weekend Warriors

To those of us who are veterans of the National Guard or Reserves no stories of military waste can match personal experience. As wasters, we were in a class by ourselves. My own memories of idle time in the Air National Guard in the 1960s are typical, I am sure, of those of the hundreds of thousands of "weekend warriors" who still spend their paid weekend drills doing little more than watching television and reading books. The GAO in 1974 documented the wasted time at such weekend training periods as costing about $1.2 billion a year.

Because nobody really expects us to be in lengthy combat with the Russians, most reservists would never be used in a real war; there would not be time for them to be assimilated into the regular forces. During Vietnam, for political reasons, very few reservists were called.

I was one of 14,000 reservists activated with the Air National Guard when the North Koreans stole the spy-ship U.S.S. *Pueblo* in 1968. For six months, as an "air policeman," I fixed parking tickets for my fellow warriors at Andrews Air Force Base near Washington, D.C., waiting to be shipped out. Finally, a few of us were sent to Korea for a year. My job was to deliver contraceptives to the off-base Korean night clubs that catered to the GI trade. After that glorious service I returned to Washington and finished my interrupted schooling courtesy of the GI bill.

The regular services recognize the problems with the reserves. The active forces are jealous of the monies diverted to the reserves' budget and doubtful about what the reservists could do in a real war anyway. The Navy even recommended to Congress last year that its paid reserve force be cut by half, to 50,000. But the Congress, demonstrating once more the strong political alliances between ranking congressmen and reserve associations, refused to approve the savings. That action added $72 million to the Navy Reserve payroll this year.

For a variety of reasons, nothing much ever gets done about the military's personnel waste. Much of it is ongoing and doesn't come up for approval the way new weapons systems do, and much of the waste gives members of Congress money for their districts, so they are loath to do away with it. Reserve and veterans' associations constitute a powerful political lobby for the status quo.

In any event, the potential savings are clear, safe, and relatively simple:

- $4 billion from instituting 30-year retirement for all but combat troops;
- $3-4 billion from eliminating unnecessary support personnel and other inefficient management practices;
- $600 million from cutting out unnecessary moves;
- $1.7 billion in personnel costs from dropping the Reserve and Guard. This would save another $2.7 billion in equipment costs;
- $1 billion from eliminating civilian grade creep.

Conservatively, that's over $7 billion that the Pentagon is wasting for reasons having nothing to do with the national defense. Somebody ought to do something about it. ■

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Tidbits and Outrages

Who Says Banks Are Unfeeling?

Credit and Financial Management magazine looks forward to automated electronic banking:

"It won't be long before customers should be able to complete most of their banking transactions without any personal contact. This will enable banks to offer more personalized services."

Means of Production

Whenever we begin to feel that Marxism has no merit at all, some news comes along from the coal industry that gets our red blood stirring again. The latest are these figures on absentee ownership of land in West Virginia's six largest coal-producing counties:

Mingo 65 per cent
Raleigh 70 per cent
McDowell 71 per cent
Logan 76 per cent
Wyoming 85 per cent
Boone 91 per cent

In McDowell County the 71 per cent is in the hands of just six large out-of-state corporations.

Notes from the Honeymoon

A couple of months ago we expressed our suspicion that the press would be exceedingly tender toward Jody Powell. Here is Edward Walsh of *The Washington Post* writing about Powell's first briefing:

"His quick wit can be combative when challenged, or can turn into a gentle, self-mocking humor from which not even his boss, the President, is immune.

"... Powell, with his engaging manner and quick wit, had still managed to get through his first full White House briefing with few, if any scars."

Profile in Courage

Richard Lyons of *The Washington Post* tells how the recent pay increase was eased through Congress:

"The House Democratic leaders, who favor the pay increase, feared that House members would kill it rather than face the political backlash of a vote for it.

"So the leaders referred the pay raise issue to the Post Office and Civil Service Committee. The committee, in turn, referred it to an ad hoc subcommittee headed by Rep. William D. Ford (D-Mich.) for three days of hearings next Monday through Wednesday.

"The House then goes on a Lincoln Day recess until Feb. 16.

"The full committee is expected to meet on the pay issue the day the House returns to work. But under House rules no measure approved by a committee can be taken up by the House until three days after a committee report on the measure has been printed. In the unlikely event the committee approved a resolution of disapproval of the pay raise, it couldn't be put to a House vote until after the 19th—when it would be too late."

Free Enterprise for the Rich

Cary Kimble wrote this persuasive letter to *The Washington Star* a few weeks ago:

"In answering reporter Stephen Aug's questions about AT&T's policy of charging for directory assistance calls, the company's chairman, Mr. deButts, stated that this service should be paid for by the person who uses it, not by all of the company's customers.

"If this principle is valid, and I would not dispute that it is, why is it not universally applied? The same Stephen Aug reported on Dec. 1 that 'the heavy costs of running the Bell System are loaded onto its monopoly telephone service, which is the basis of its entire operations.' In other words, services like WATS and Telepak, which are subject to competition and available primarily to large users, are subsidized in part by services like ordinary long-distance dialing."

But if we side with Kimble against AT&T on that issue, we must sympathize with Ma Bell on another. According to the magazine *Datamation*, the Justice Department in its initial request for documents in its antitrust suit against AT&T "asked for every piece of paper in the Bell System's possession that was 'prepared, sent or received since Jan. 1, 1930,' that relates to the issues."

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The Better, Cheaper Plane the Pentagon Didn't Want

by George E. Hopkins

Suppose somebody built a warplane that was cheaper, tougher, and better than anything the big aerospace companies could produce? Wouldn't the Pentagon brass be eager to have a look at this new weapon? That's what David B. Lindsay, Jr. thought when he conceived and built the Enforcer, a low-flying troop-support aircraft.

Lindsay, a wealthy newspaper publisher whose hobby is antique airplanes, began thinking seriously about designing such an aircraft after hearing Vietnam pilots complain about the shortcomings of their supersophisticated jets. Air Force pilots visiting the Sarasota, Florida plant of Lindsay's Cavalier Aircraft Company (which modifies World War II P-51 Mustang fighters for airplane buffs) told him the old airplane would probably do a better job than anything they'd flown in combat. Lindsay knew the Mustang was rugged, reliable, and stable at slow speeds (essential qualities for an aircraft that must withstand enemy ground fire while delivering its own fire accurately in support of ground troops), but he dismissed the idea of up-dating one of his old Mustangs as a pipe dream, the kind in which airplane buffs

George Hopkins teaches history at Western Illinois University and writes often about aviation.

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



Top: David Lindsay's Enforcer
Bottom: World War II Spitfire

frequently indulge.

Then, in 1971, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, dismayed at the skyrocketing costs of the Fairchild A-10 (which the Air Force had selected, at $4 million apiece, as its primary close-support aircraft), called for cheaper airplanes and indicated that the Pentagon would look favorably on new, innovative offerings from small companies.

Such talk, coming from the Pentagon's hard-nosed boss, was all it took to prod Lindsay into action. Using his own money (with help from Piper Aircraft Company), Lindsay began tinkering with the Mustang airframe. He developed seven new patented features to strengthen the aircraft's structure and installed a light-weight, reliable, powerful Lycoming T-55 jet-prop engine (a model that the Pentagon already had 300 of in surplus storage). To protect the pilot and vital aircraft components, Lindsay installed space-age ceramic armor, which is superior to other forms of protective armor. Finally, Lindsay outfitted his airplane with simple, no-nonsense weapons delivery systems—the kind favored by pilots with recent combat experience.

Aware that the weapons close-support aircraft use are a major cause

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of high costs (some anti-tank missiles run over $100,000 each), Lindsay began experimenting with an airborne recoilless rifle. The 106mm recoilless rifle, the principal anti-tank weapon of ground forces, is cheap, reliable, and effective. A single 106mm shell costing less than $100 can knock out a tank as easily as can a $100,000 missile. But experts usually claim missiles are necessary because the blast from 106mm recoilless rifles would literally knock an aircraft out of the sky. Lindsay thought otherwise.

In June 1974, at the China Lake Naval Weapons Test Center in California, an old, unmodified Mustang took off with a 106mm recoilless rifle attached to its wing. Keeping one hand nervously on his parachute, the pilot test-fired the weapon several times with remarkable accuracy. The old Mustang did fine. Lindsay, who was serving as an unpaid consultant during the China Lake tests, was elated. He now knew he could produce a weapons system that cost less than $700,000 and, as Pentagon officials admitted, seemed to perform as well as a Fairchild A-10. Lockheed was so impressed that it signed on with Lindsay for the right to manufacture his wonder plane when the inevitable orders started pouring in.

They never came. Lindsay's Enforcer had cost the taxpayers nothing. It was the first privately developed warplane anyone could remember—at least since before World War II. In a series of limited tests, conducted at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida in 1974, the Enforcer actually outperformed an A-10. But the service chiefs expressed no interest in the Enforcer. None was willing to take the next step—a full-scale test geared to the needs of a specific branch of the armed services.

Technical analysis of a warplane is admittedly intricate and arcane, clearly a job for experts. But nobody can ever be precisely sure how a weapon will perform in combat, and this "uncertainty principle," which the military uses frequently to justify a redundant "mix" of weaponry (this may be the only rational justification for the B-1 bomber), ought to make the Enforcer attractive. An imposing array of support for an Enforcer flight test developed, including civilian Pentagon officials and congressional leaders. Senator John Stennis indicated that there would be no problem getting the money for a test—*if* the military requested it. But in a highly unusual situation, the military, never hesitant about taking money, refused to ask for it.

Of course, the military's business is to know what it needs. Historically it has had good reason to distrust cheap solutions. Over the years military men have become inured to the stream of wonder weapons, death rays, and the like that amateurs foist upon them. These weapons rarely pan out, but the occasional one that does makes testing the weird remainder worthwhile. The Navy even spent a considerable chunk of money testing out the military uses of the frisbee (it didn't have any). That's why the military's cold shoulder to the Enforcer struck many observers as oddly out of character. Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements, Jr., who wanted to test the Enforcer, declared: "There is little question that the Enforcer aircraft can meet the general performance claims made by its offerer." But most of the military insisted that those performance claims were exaggerated.

David Lindsay disputes this, and he has a series of favorable tests to support him. Early in 1974, with fuel costs rising, civilian Pentagon analysts conducted a full-scale computer study of the Enforcer, judging fuel savings against combat effectiveness. The Enforcer looked good, and a series of comparisons with the Fairchild A-10 made it look even better. The military discounted the computer study as just paper and relied on what was apparently an intuitive feeling that the Enforcer lacked lethality.

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Why doesn't the military need the Enforcer? This question perplexes economy-minded congressmen and has strengthened their suspicion that the Pentagon always opts for the most expensive solution. Senator William Proxmire, for one, believes that the military's basic resistance to the Enforcer stems from its low cost. "The military," he says, "is simply unwilling to explore ways for reducing costs." An expert on the Senate Armed Services Committee staff agrees: "The services are closing every door they can. The Enforcer is too practical and cheap to appeal to them."

In the Dustbin of History

An entrenched, careerist military bureaucracy tied to financial groups with an interest in certain weapons can be dangerous. In the case of the Enforcer, the range of special interest groups opposing a fair test is a broad one, encompassing everything from military men looking toward post-retirement defense employment to labor unions fearful of lost jobs. The broader national interest requires something else. History is littered with disastrous examples of soldiers sent to fight with weapons ill-suited to the purpose at hand.

And when weaponry does work right, it's often not to the credit of the commanding generals. If the Enforcer is not yet an absolutely open-and-shut case of a great plane ignored, there is an earlier case that fits that description perfectly: the British fighter plane, Spitfire. The Spitfire was the real hero of the Battle of Britain; it repelled the Luftwaffe's huge bombers, which had effortlessly brought the rest of Europe to its knees. A graceful, small, beautifully photogenic plane, the Spitfire caught the public's imagination, and became a popular symbol of Britain's underdog struggle against the Nazis.

In a curious way, the Spitfire haunts the Pentagon today. It was the weapon nobody wanted, considered by the best military minds of that generation to be superfluous. And yet it turned out to be crucial in stemming the Nazi tide. Could a similar weapon be overlooked today?

It's possible that tomorrow's Spitfire may languish unwanted in some remote hangar or obscure scientist's workshop because of the incompetence or cupidity of the military bureaucracy. Perhaps the Enforcer is the Spitfire of the future, but even if it is not, the military's attitude toward it is very disturbing.

Of course no historical analogy is absolute. The Spitfire was designed to fight other planes, the Enforcer to protect troops on the ground. But the principles involved may be the same. The Spitfire grew out of the technical virtuosity of an English aircraft designer named Reginald Mitchell. He was an eccentric in the grand English tradition who had no academic training beyond high school. But like thousands of young men born during aviation's infancy, Mitchell was fascinated with airplanes. Poor health prevented his being a pilot (indeed, he completed work on the Spitfire while terminally ill and died in 1937 before the plane could prove itself), so

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Mitchell devoted himself to aircraft design. The result was the Supermarine Schneider Cup racing planes, which swept all international competition from 1927 to 1931 and became the prototype for the Spitfire.

The trouble was that the English government cared little for Mitchell's speedy single-seaters. The reason for the government's disinterest lay in the defense theory of the time. Sir Hugh Trenchard, the father of the Royal Air Force, accepted the ideas of an obscure Italian named Guilio Douhet, who in the early 1920s began arguing that armadas of high-flying bombers could make wars like the 1914-18 affair obsolete. Wars did not, Douhet believed, have to be protracted combats, pitting nations' birth rates and industrial productivity in the trenches; instead, cheap victories could result from aerial bombing of an enemy's vital industries, thereby eliminating the basic ability to field armies. Douhet's vision of cheap and easy victory was irresistible to politicians intent on trimming defense budgets and to the military men who sought to accommodate them.

During the interwar years, both the Americans and the British accepted Douhet's theories and molded their aerial priorities accordingly. The doctrine of the overwhelming bomber offensive held that purely defensive expenditures, such as the development of fighter aircraft, were a waste of money because the bombers would always get through. Light, protective planes like the Spitfire didn't fit into the scheme.

But events proved Douhet's neat theories wrong. Fleets of high-flying bombers suffered appalling losses to Luftwaffe fighters during the first daylight raids of World War II. American commanders reluctantly held back until long-range escort fighters such as the P-51 Mustang were ready and then, during a series of bloody battles early in 1944, defeated the Luftwaffe over Europe and proceeded with the unhampered bombing that did so much to undermine the Third Reich.

Of course a few fighter men like Claire Chennault and Sir Hugh Dowding (who headed Fighter Command during the Battle of Britain), questioned the conventional wisdom, but nobody paid much attention. Chennault derided the notion that machine-gun fire from massed American bomber formations could repel determined enemy fighter assaults. But he was so abrasive in stating his case that his superiors made a point of ignoring his demonstrations of proof. Like Chennault, Sir Hugh Dowding tirelessly argued that accompanying fighter planes were necessary for offensive bomber operations. The Battle of Britain proved Dowding right, but he so irritated British officialdom that he was sacked soon after—a shocking reward for the architect of victory. Chennault's accomplishments were less important than Dowding's, but both men wound up exactly where they began—as maverick outsiders, victims of the rigid conformity that has always characterized military bureaucracies.

The only thing that has changed since then is that military conformity is worse. Mavericks of the Chennault-Dowding mode, if they are around

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tion with career officers. Moreover, unlike his predecessors, Carter also takes office committed to curtailing the defense budget, of which the Navy currently gets the largest slice.

Even some of the new President's warmest admirers wonder whether he can make good on this pledge or, for that matter, even hold the line on military spending. The power of the Pentagon lobby is awesome, especially the Navy branch, because the Navy



has always been the favorite service on Capitol Hill.

Georgians and other Southerners have long dominated the military committees. The numerous and costly defense installations that have enriched Carter's state are tributes to the power of the late Sen. Richard Russell, who was chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Rep. Carl Vinson, who presided for many years over the House committees that controlled naval expenditures. By a remarkable coincidence, the Navy, several weeks after Carter's election, announced that a mothballed ocean terminal at Kings Bay, Georgia had just become its preferred location for a new $91-million base to support missile-firing submarines.

If Carter is serious about cracking down on the armed forces, he will have to begin with the Navy, for that's where most of the money goes. It wasn't always that way. During World

War II and the Korean War the Army was top dog. Then it was the Air Force, but now it is definitely the Navy, and more so every year. For fiscal 1977 (ending in October of this year) the Navy gets 38.8 per cent of the Pentagon budget, the Air Force follows with 33.3 per cent, and the Army trails with 27.9 per cent.

The total defense budget for fiscal 1977 comes to around $114 billion. Unless the White House and Congress intervene, it could climb to over $123 billion in the first budget Carter will have to deal with.

Money, though, is only one phase of the Navy problem that Carter has inherited. Perhaps even more important than the sum of the naval budget is the question of how it is to be spent and for what. For years Carter's predecessors, along with various Defense Secretaries, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operations, have been arguing inconclusively over the size, shape, and primary mission of the U.S. Navy. So the future character of the Navy is still unsettled and unsettling. It is a propitious moment for a determined new President, savvy and experienced in naval affairs, to step in and give the service the direction it needs.

"It is an unfortunate fact," said President Kennedy, "that we can secure peace only by preparing for war." But what kind of a war? Sixty years before Kennedy, George Bernard Shaw enraged England's generals and admirals when he remarked that military preparation was an endless

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rehearsal for an event that doesn't take place, and when it does, is never like the rehearsals. The collapse of the French Maginot line in World War II was a testament to Shaw's dictum, but many others could be cited. If Shaw were alive today he no doubt would cite the Navy's long line of aircraft carriers as the best contemporary example of Maginot thinking; certainly that is the view of many respected military strategists, along with a number of non-blackshoe admirals. (The term blackshoe refers to those senior officers who once built the Navy around battleships but since World War II have transferred their allegiance to the mammoth carriers.)

An Expensive Basket

While the blackshoe admirals still have the balance of power within the naval establishment, they are under strong and increasing challenge from fellow officers both here and abroad, who believe the advent of nuclear power, modern attack submarines, and cruise missiles have made the lumbering carriers obsolete. The United States, remarks one British admiral, "is putting all her naval eggs in one basket," and a very expensive basket it is, too.

The new supercarriers cost $2 billion each just to build; add all the fixings and escort protection, and the price probably doubles or triples. Vice Admiral George P. Steele, Ret., former commander of the Seventh Fleet, charges that for three decades "the major U.S. Navy surface combatants have been subordinated to the defense of the aircraft carrier. This has shriveled the Navy's fighting ability on the surface until it is now incapable of standing up to Soviet cruisers armed with potent long-range cruise missiles." Retiring Sen. Robert A. Taft, Jr., put it more sardonically. The Russians, he said, "have organized their fleet around a concept designed specifically to defeat our fleet; we retain a concept designed to defeat the Imperial Japanese Navy 30 years ago."

The future role of carriers, however, is only part of a larger question concerning the relative importance of the Navy's two major missions: "power projection," the capability of exerting far-flung, sea-based military force against objectives on hostile shores; and "sea control," the ability to keep the sea lanes open to friendly shipping in the event of war.

A general-purpose fleet geared to sea control, a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report asserts, would forgo any attempt at power projection against the Soviet Union. It would depend primarily on the capability of U. S. anti-submarine forces to defeat the Soviet submarine force, which, of course, is the main threat to American control of the sea lanes. In the CBO view, other U. S. naval forces would be used primarily to support and defend the anti-submarine forces.

"While retaining and using combat vessels currently in the fleet," the study finds, "further procurement of major projection-oriented warships such as carriers, strike cruisers, and large destroyers would not be needed." The savings would run into many billions of dollars. On the other hand, a power projection Navy would require the procurement of more carriers and supporting vessels to attack land-based military objectives. The CBO estimates that a program geared to enhancing significantly the Navy's capability to perform this mission would cost about $13.5 billion in ships alone.



The USS Nimitz, *cruising the Mediterranean.*

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Besides the enormous cost, there remains the problem of vulnerability. Naval forces approaching the U.S.S.R., the study notes, would increasingly become absorbed in self-defense as they came within range of Soviet land-based air forces. "There are serious doubts," it reports, "that even self-defense would be successful, given the intensity of attacks that Soviet short and medium range defenses can mount." Finally, it concludes, attack of such Soviet targets as can be reached from the sea would not be likely to affect the outcome of a war over Europe.

It must be kept in mind that in an atomic confrontation with the Soviet Union, the U.S., of course, would ultimately rely for real power projection on its incomparable "Triad," the strategic force composed of thousands of nuclear missiles to be fired from underground silos, from submerged submarines, and from high-flying B-52 bombers—a combination guaranteed to make a wasteland of Russia or any other foe.

Clinging To the Old Strategy

Yet as the Pentagon's new fiscal budget and its annual "posture" statement show, the carrier admirals still cling to their power projection strategy. Their outlook is well articulated by the current Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James Holloway III. "Our country," he says, "has a forward strategy. We are overseas-oriented economically and politically. Our military strategy uses the oceans as barriers in our defense and as avenues *extending national influence*" (italics added).

To implement a forward strategy, he argues, "we need a certain kind of Navy—a Navy that has carriers to provide air power overseas where we don't have bases. . . we have to have operating fleets that have the ability to conduct offensive operations to forward-deployed forces." The admiral emphasizes that "we've got treaties or defense arrangements with 43

other nations, and 41 of them are overseas."

All this suggests that the Navy leadership either has failed to note or has not taken seriously statements by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger disavowing a Pax America future for the U.S. It also indicates the Navy is not very impressed by the trend toward pulling back some of our troops from overextended positions overseas, nor with the growing disposition in Congress to curtail far-flung commitments.

Under President Carter there is good reason to believe that the contraction of our world policeman role will become more marked as time goes on. If that is the case, the proponents of a submarine sea-control Navy may be on the point of coming into their own. Their cause has been advanced not only by the CBO study, but by other authoritative, disinterested observers as well, notably the experts at the Center for Defense Information, headed by Rear Admiral Gene LaRocque (USN, Ret.).

Admiral LaRocque's interest goes beyond just keeping the sea lanes open. For years now, he says, Soviet strategic submarines have been patrolling the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans

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carrying missiles capable of reaching all American cities. He sees these submarines as "an obvious military threat to the U.S. and the only Soviet threat we face from the sea." He thinks the mission of our Navy should be to prevent these Russian submarines from launching an attack on our homeland, but he says the mission has not been assigned. Why? To some naval planners, LaRocque says, "it appears as a task of such monumental proportions that it is impossible to accomplish, and hence best ignored." Other naval planners, he contends, "are too engrossed in plans for offensive operations against the Soviet Union and Third World countries."

LaRocque sees the current naval force structure as "badly lopsided," with too much money and effort expended on perpetuating "an outdated Navy built around the vulnerable and extremely expensive carrier forces." He, too, thinks the ability of the Navy to project its military power ashore is "excessive," and he believes this force could be cut in half, with the resources transferred to counter the Soviet submarine threat. He would particularly curtail attack-aircraft carriers, nuclear strike cruisers, and their smaller escort vessels.

The Biggest Piece of the Pie

There is little in the new fiscal 1978 Navy budget, however, to appease the carrier critics or to encourage the Carter administration's hopes of reducing the defense budget, which again gives the Navy the biggest piece of the pie—$41 billion, a jump of $4 billion. The budget's only real surprise was its omission of an expected request for another 90,000-ton supercarrier at a cost of over $2 billion.

In a special briefing on the budget just before he retired, former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld made it clear, however, that the plan is to proceed as rapidly as possible with the design and construction of numerous new 40,000-ton and 50,000-ton carriers as an alternative to additional supercarriers. This, Rumsfeld said, is in line with the recommendation of a recent National Security Council study. But in the view of outside experts, buying a larger number of smaller carriers would neither save money nor improve the survivability of these surface forces.

Although President Carter has repeatedly pledged to reduce the defense budget by $5 billion or more, experience shows that campaign rhetoric should not be taken too literally, so it is not yet clear what he will do now that he is in the White House. He has yet to face that awesome barrage the Navy and the other services lay down on Capitol Hill about this time every year, just before the appropriations hearings begin on the next defense budget. While the propaganda campaign is always some spin-off of The-Russians-Are-Coming, it is not clear what this year's particular version of this ancient scare theme will be. The best guess at the moment is that it will be an extension of the stunningly successful 1976 pitch, which intimidated Congress into giving the Pentagon everything it asked for—and more. The end result was the nation's first $100-billion defense budget, which, with supplementary authorizations, finally came

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to around $114 billion.

Aided and abetted by dubious new CIA "evidence," the Ford administration and the Pentagon bombarded Congress and the public with statistics purporting to show that the Russians were outspending the U.S. militarily by 50 per cent, and that we were in dire danger of becoming an inferior military power. Other questionable evidence was dredged up to scare the country into believing that the Soviets were engaged in such a superior naval ship-building program that U.S. control of the seas was being fatally compromised.

Defense Intelligence Agency briefings were arranged for members of Congress, classified "secret" because that usually impresses the legislators. The Pentagon charts, virtually all showing a rising slope for Russia and a downward slope for the U.S., were circulated widely on Capitol Hill. Selected congressional groups were invited to the White House for "national security briefings."

Senator William Proxmire called it all "an outright distortion of the facts." Rep. Les Aspin, perhaps the best informed member of Congress on defense affairs, said "yesterday's missile gap is today's dollar gap."

'So Formidable a Threat'

Nevertheless, the protesting voices were largely drowned out by the power and prestige of the administration spokesmen. Former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger warned that "at no point since the 1930s has the western world faced so formidable a threat to its survival." The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General George Brown, showed little patience for those who "evidently think we are still stronger than the Soviets despite what the figures show." The Air Force Chief of Staff, General David Jones, asserted that "in relative terms the Soviets have been running full speed, while we have been standing still," and "as you look at what they are doing, it is mind boggling in every



respect." Donald Rumsfeld, Schlesinger's successor at the Pentagon, said that "we are not number one if one looks at the basic military capabilities as between the U.S. and the Soviet Union."

It turned out that the CIA, in assessing a radical increase in Soviet military spending, calculated the Russian budget in terms of the dollar, although the Russians spend rubles, not dollars, and the ruble, being outside international currency markets, has no established rate of exchange. The Center for Defense Information found also that the Pentagon's high estimates of Soviet military spending were based "on the incorrect premise that the Soviets pay their soldiers American wages." Russia, it noted, maintains a large land army in part because of its long history of being invaded and because it confronts China, which has the largest army in the world. Much of the increase in Soviet military spending has gone for purposes that do not directly threaten the U.S.

The CIA itself later indicated that it did not put much stock in the "dollarization" of Soviet military effort. William Colby, former CIA director, acknowledged that "we do this because of the demand for it," adding, "our estimates probably tend to overstate the costs of the Soviet design." And General Daniel Graham, the recently retired director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, says, "Any attempt to measure the efforts of a command economy such as the

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USSR's in terms of the currency of a free economy such as ours is doomed to produce misleading results."

Yet the attempt was made, and it succeeded on Capitol Hill. Moreover, it was followed up by an equally successful attempt to picture the Soviets as turning the U.S. into a second-rate naval power. Admiral Rickover said he was "concerned that there has never been anything comparable to the current growth of Russian naval men. . . . While their numbers continue to increase, ours continue to decline."

Outspending the Russians

Actually the fleets of both superpowers have contracted in recent years. The U.S. Navy, however, is beginning to grow while the Soviet Navy is continuing to shrink. Aspin has produced a CIA analysis showing that in the last five years the U.S. outspent Russia almost two to one in the construction of major warships. "In an attempt to stampede Congress into approving a huge shipbuilding program," Aspin said, "the Pentagon has been painting an opposite picture that the Soviet Union is outspending and outbuilding the U.S. on naval ships."

A Library of Congress study found in the 1969-1976 period, an average of 17.4 ships were delivered annually to the Soviet Navy. That was less than half the annual delivery rate of 45.5 ships during the 1958-68 period, when the Russians were engaged in a large-scale build-up. The Center for Defense Information reports that the U.S. Navy "is substantially superior to the Soviet Navy." In the last ten years, it says, the number of Soviet attack submarines has "drastically declined." Moreover, the Defense Department expects a future decline in the number of Soviet submarines and major surface ships.

In the end the effort to scare Congress into passing a record defense budget boomeranged on President Ford when Ronald Reagan seized on the administration's own propaganda to accuse it of letting the country slip into a position of military inferiority. In self-defense, candidate Ford began contradicting the earlier administration line. In a Texas campaign speech he said, "There are those who would seek to raise false alarms—by saying, for example, the Soviet Union has more ships than we do. But the fact is, you do not compare numbers. You compare total firepower, you compare tonnage and combat capability—and you find we are on top."

Henry Kissinger followed up by saying, "Despite the inevitable increase in Soviet power, it remains behind us and our allies in any overall assessment of military, economic, and technological strength. It would be reckless and extreme for the Soviet Union to challenge the industrial democracies. . . . No service is done to the nation by those who portray an exaggerated specter of Soviet power and of American weakness."

Nonetheless, the more the U.S. is at peace, the more it spends for war. The latest Pentagon budget, at a time when America is not at war or even threatened, is vastly greater than it was at the height of the Vietnam conflict. And unless the new President boldly intervenes, the budget will continue to rise *ad infinitum*, from over $120 billion this year to $150 billion or more by the end of Carter's term in 1980.

As for the Navy alone, it does seem prudent to spend enough money to make sure that our submarine and anti-submarine forces are superior to the Russians'. Beyond that, however, the Navy's projected expenditures seem a logical candidate for the honor of being the first to undergo the zero-based budgeting that Jimmy Carter has promised for the government as a whole. The admirals would have to justify not only the building of new ships but the maintenance of the existing ones. It will be interesting to see what they have to say, especially what they have to say about the carriers. ■

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What the Times and Post Are Missing

by Nick Kotz

Question: What do the following four statements have in common?

■Attorney General Griffin Bell, as a federal judge, probably violated the law in ruling on a case in which he previously had been involved as a private attorney.

■Jimmy Carter, as governor of Georgia, practiced secrecy while preaching openness and used the political clout of highway construction projects to reward friends and punish enemies.

■Gerald Ford, as House minority leader, served a bank of which he was a board member by keeping it informed of pertinent legislation on banking.

■President Nixon spent millions in federal funds beyond the amount legitimately needed to support the American maritime industry.

Answer: Each of the above statements was the thrust of a newspaper story written by a Washington correspondent. None of the stories appeared in a Washington or New York City newspaper. None of the stories produced any significant official reaction in Washington. And each was written by a reporter frustrated that his story did not have the impact that he thought it deserved.

"It was like pouring good whiskey down the drain," complains Phil Gailey, who, along with Aaron Epstein of the Knight Newspapers' Washington bureau, wrote a comprehensive series about Jimmy Carter's record as governor of Georgia. The 7,500-word series, based on two months of research in the Georgia state archives, provided the most original and revealing account of Carter's record as governor, including both his failures and his accomplishments. The stories featured internal memos between Carter, Hamilton Jordan, and Bert Lance, showing graphically how they worked. The stories appeared in early September 1976, at a time when they provided valuable information for voters who wanted to know more about presidential candidate Carter.

The Gailey-Epstein stories weren't exactly poured down the drain. They appeared in the Knight newspapers (which include *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, *The Detroit Free Press*, and *The Miami Herald*) and in several large papers that subscribe to the Knight news service. But the articles never became part of the national election story. Why? Because they did not appear in *The Washington Post* or *The New York Times*.

"The story might as well have not been written; it fell down a rat hole," says Joe Albright about the impact of his comprehensive and revealing reportage in *Newsday* on the Nixon White House's largesse to the shipping industry. Had the series appeared in the *Times* or *Post*, the papers read by official Washington and New York media managers, there probably would have been public outrage and a congressional investigation.

Another story that should have

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had Washington impact but didn't was Saul Friedman's examination of Gerald Ford's mix of service to a bank with service in Congress. Friedman, of the Knight bureau, has long been one of Washington's best investigative reporters, but his work is seldom noticed in Washington.

It is not just the exposé or the lengthy interpretive story that often fails to get deserved attention in Washington. Richard Dudman's account of Griffin Bell's possibly illegal conflict of interest was based on public testimony at Bell's Senate confirmation hearing. "That was the most telling development of the whole hearing but it got no play at all in the big Eastern papers," says Dudman, Washington bureau chief of the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*. "Because the *Post* and *Times* did not cover that development, it escaped the attention of most people, and particularly in this city where the Senate was about to vote on Bell's confirmation."

Dudman, Friedman, Albright, Gailey, and Epstein are among the hundreds of Washington correspondents whose work does not appear in Washington and seldom becomes a major part of the political chemistry that occurs in the interaction between the federal government and the press. When that chemistry is at work, an investigative exposé may force a political reform, and an informed interpretive story may cause a reevaluation of government policy.

Interviews with Washington correspondents from the so-called "provincial press" (the non-Washington or New York press) reveal two unfortunate patterns. The first is that their own work does not have the public impact that it should, an impact that would provide more diversity in the national news. Moreover, *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* dominate the national news process in Washington and New York, both directly through their presence and indirectly by influencing not only the television networks and weekly magazines, but the hundreds of newspapers that subscribe either to the Times or the Post-Los Angeles Times news services.

Only a Fraction

My own unscientific survey of news executives in Washington and New York indicates that the *Post* and the *Times* are the newspapers they read most closely in Washington, followed by *The Wall Street Journal*, the wire services, and *The Washington Star*. In New York, the *Times* dominates, followed by *The Wall Street Journal* and *The Washington Post*. The *Times* has a Washington circulation of 19,000 daily, and *The Wall Street Journal*'s is about 40,000. The *Post*'s New York circulation is only 1,600, but it is read by executives at the networks and news magazines.

There are 1,200 newspaper reporters accredited to the congressional press gallery, and only a fraction of them are employed by newspapers that are read regularly in Washington or New York. Most of these reporters only occasionally produce news of national significance. Their primary task is regional or local coverage—the important job of keeping people back home informed of the actions of their congressmen and of federal actions that affect them. Many of these reporters do their job well; others do little more than reproduce handouts from the government. But there are at least several hundred correspondents from newspapers outside New York and Washington who seek to cover the national news as well as issues of local interest. Some of them contribute

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mainly to pack journalism, reproducing the obvious stories and offering versions of them little different than the wire-service accounts. But there are dozens of outstanding reporters who produce competent and original news of national interest. They work for news operations as diverse as the two-man bureau of the Louisville *Courier-Journal* and the 23-member bureau of the *Los Angeles Times*.

Not only are these reporters frustrated that their stories lack impact in Washington and are not read by their news sources or friends, they also receive fewer news leaks than do the more influential reporters from the *Post* and the *Times*, and they have more trouble getting their telephone calls returned. Government officials respond most readily to newspapers with the greatest power to help or hurt them. Morton Kondracke, who was a crack reporter in the *Chicago Sun-Times*' Washington bureau until he recently quit to become an editor-reporter at *The New Republic*, describes the frustration: "I was really bothered by this problem. I was depressed that writing good stories just made no difference here. I used to joke about what happened to my stories. I called it the 'Chicago Truth Machine.' You sent things out to Chicago and they never came back. They were never seen again."

The theme of lost stories is sounded by every Washington correspondent who has had a good story with potential Washington reverberations that never happened because the story never got back to Washington. Describing that process, Jack Nelson, the Pulitzer Prize-winning bureau chief of the *Los Angeles Times*, says: "News seems to flow downstream from East to West. Unfortunately, stories have a great deal of trouble coming back upstream to spawn in Washington."

Nelson's particular frustrations were compounded because even *The Washington Post*, which shares a news service with the *Los Angeles Times*, did not use many original *Times* stories. Instead it either ignored them or used them as a tip sheet. L.A. *Times* reporters have complained for years about the *Post*'s neglect. The complaints have reached the ear of *Post* Executive Editor Ben Bradlee, who recently issued a strongly worded memo ordering his editors to use good *Times* stories and properly credit them.

Finding Their Way Back

Most of the editors in Washington and New York do not think they are missing much by not reading the Washington reports of *The Des Moines Register* or the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*. Editors like Ben Bradlee and Maynard Parker, national editor of *Newsweek*, and Washington bureau chiefs like Hedrick Smith of *The New York Times*, Hugh Sidey of *Time*, and the Associated Press' Martin Arrowsmith believe that really good stories produced by other reporters in Washington will somehow find their way back to Washington, via their own correspondents in the field, the wire services, or interest in Congress.

Very few of these national news organizations attempt in any systematic way to monitor many newspapers from outside Washington and New York, although Hedrick Smith at the *Times* and Deputy Managing Editor Richard Harwood at the *Post* both say they are going to initiate such monitoring projects. Exceptions are the Washington bureau of *Newsweek* and the Washington bureau of *The Wall Street Journal*, where reporters are assigned to read *The Boston Globe*,

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The Atlanta Constitution, *Chicago Sun-Times*, *Los Angeles Times*, *The Detroit News*, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, *The Des Moines Register*, *The Christian Science Monitor*, and the Baltimore *Sun*.

"I see good stuff in all those papers and others that we don't really utilize," says Mike Miller, the *Journal*'s Washington bureau chief. "I think we are losing something. Some of the best stuff coming out of Washington is from Tom Ottenad and Dick Dudman of the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, Marty Nolan of *The Boston Globe*, and from the L.A. *Times* bureau, which is as good as any in town."

The Washington correspondents for papers outside Washington and New York are virtually unanimous in their complaint that AP and UPI wire service offices out in the country do not pick up their exclusive stories and move them back to Washington and New York via the national wire. Arrowsmith of AP and Grant Dillman, UPI's Washington bureau chief, dismiss much of this criticism as unfounded but acknowledge that wire service editors outside of Washington often are not well informed enough about the nuances of Washington reportage to know whether a story represents a new and exclusive development. In addition, Arrowsmith said the wires usually are too overloaded to move a long and complicated story.

Whether a story makes its way back into the Washington-New York national information mill depends to some extent on its complexity and its relationship to hot items then in the news. For example, Adam Clymer, then of the Baltimore *Sun*, and a team of writers from the *Los Angeles Times*—Jack Nelson, Robert Jackson, Ronald Ostrow, and Gaylord Shaw—produced numerous scoops on Watergate stories after the initial Woodward-Bernstein phase. But most of these stories were momentary scoops from which the *Post* and *Times* recovered in a few days, so that the only thing that was lost was proper credit to the reporter who had the story first. However, in one case, Jack Nelson's scoop on the tape in which Nixon tells Mitchell "I want you to stonewall it," and advises that others "plead the Fifth Amendment, cover up," it seems probable that if the *Post* or *Times* reporters had gotten the story, it would have been treated as *the* smoking gun and would have brought the Watergate cover-up to an end months earlier. But because it was a provincial reporter's story the *Post* ran it on page eight and the *Times* gave it similar ho-hum treatment.

The stories that often don't make it back to Washington are ones outside the current page-one news and stories that are not easy to duplicate because of their complexity or interpretive nature. A classic example was *The Des Moines Register*'s 1975 examination of commodity trading. George Anthan, Clark Mollenhoff, and James Risser of the *Register*'s Washington bureau wrote several dozen stories detailing potential manipulation and price-fixing in America's multibillion-dollar commodity exchanges. The stories were pertinent to every American consumer, yet they never became national news—that is, they never appeared in the *Post*, the *Times*, the news magazines, or the networks. The *Register* stories nevertheless led to new regulatory legislation because congressmen from Iowa became interested in the problem. But the story still has not become national news and less than a handful of Washington reporters know that there is a new commodity trading commission that warrants careful watching.

The *Minneapolis Tribune* is

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Wayne Hays Diana H. Walker

up—the stationery allowance, 85 per cent; the out-of-pocket expense account, 150 per cent; the free-trips-home allowance, 116 per cent; and money for staff salaries, 60 per cent. All these accounts, as we'll see, are quite directly applicable to reelection campaigns.

Conventional wisdom has it that in the summer of 1976, following Hays' demise, the House passed a series of reforms that ended the various abuses and unfair perquisites of the Hays era. Not true. The new rules have made the money flow not stricter and smaller, but freer and larger.

Under a closed rule (a rule restricting debate on the floor, extremely rare for an appropriations bill) that was mandated by the House Democratic Caucus, the office accounts revisions were pushed through Congress last July. The revisions removed spending limits on some old accounts and added new perquisites, too.

Here's what the new rules did:

—They created an unlimited WATS line for long-distance calls, a setup every campaign manager dreams of. For an average year of calls by a congressman from Chicago, the new telephone allowance would be worth about $27,000 a year.

—They increased the travel allowance, which under Hays rose from 12 to 26 free trips back home a year, to 32 trips a year. The increase was designed to let congressmen go home near election time more often than the usual every two weeks. For that

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same Chicago congressman, this is worth $7,600 a year.

–They changed the allowance for renting a district office, determining it according to price per square foot in a way that increases the allowance for urban congressmen.

–They allotted new funds for the rental of a van or trailer as a mobile office in the district. These mobile offices are invaluable campaign aids.

–They allowed unlimited transfer of funds between nine small accounts whose total is more than $60,000 a year. The accounts were previously all separate and their funds untransferable, but now money from other accounts can be poured into one small one, making it newly substantial. For instance, there is an allowance called "Official Expenses Outside of the District of Columbia" that can cover anything a congressman spends "that would qualify as ordinary and necessary business expenses under the Internal Revenue Service Code and Regulations." The IRS approves as business expenses things like maintenance of a boat, payment of club fees, gifts, dinners, and bar tabs. Before last summer this allowance was limited to $2,000; now it is one of the nine accounts among which money can be shifted, so if a congressman wanted to he could pour all $60,000 into it and use it to entertain, say, influential constituents.

The Old Standbys

These new perquisites join a host of older ones that have been in existence for years, although their use seems to be on the rise. Perhaps the most invaluable campaign tool among them is the time-honored franking privilege, which allows congressmen to send mail free.

The average congressional district has approximately 170,000 postal patrons—that is, places where mail is delivered. The average congressman mails four newsletters (which are little more than self-advertisements) to every address in his district four times a year. Since franked mail is, by law, treated as first-class mail, the postage for a year of these mailings would come to $88,400. The average challenger for a seat in the House, by contrast, spends about $75,000 on *his entire campaign.*

There is no limit on the use of the franking privilege and no restriction on the number of mailings that can be sent to constituents. Congressmen who are running scared have been known to mail as often as eight times a year, using $176,000 worth of postage. The number of franked mass mailings skyrockets, of course, in even-numbered years; the privilege is of such clear political benefit that Common Cause has sued Congress for its removal, saying the frank constitutes an unfair electoral advantage for incumbents.

The trouble with the franking privilege was always that there were other costs besides postage associated with sending out newsletters. To remedy that, the House in 1975 granted its members a "Constituent Communications Allowance" to cover the staff and printing costs of producing newsletters. The allowance has no specific dollar value, but is supposed to cover two newsletters a year. Committee staffs are empowered to decide for themselves how much the allotment should be, and it usually ends up in the neighborhood of $5,000 a year.

That, however, only leaves the newsletters written, printed, and stamped, so there are other perquisites too. The House Publications Distribution Service, known as the folding room, is equipped with automatic machinery to fold the newsletters, insert them into envelopes, and bundle them for mailing—all free. The envelopes are free too, and each congressman is entitled to about $5,000 worth a year. If a congressman wants to maintain an unusually heavy pace of mailing, he can, under the 1976 rule changes, increase his printing allowance by transferring to it funds from different accounts.

Mass mailing has become a boom-

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Memo of the Month

Advisory Council on
Historic Preservation
1522 K Street N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005

January 11, 1977

Memorandum

To: Council Staff

From: Executive Director

Subject: Correspondence

In all correspondence requiring the use of the name of the Council, the full name Advisory Council on Historic Preservation should be used when the name first appears. Thereafter, the Council should be used never the Advisory Council. This same pattern should be used in oral or written presentations. Our objective is to subordinate the term Advisory. At the December meeting, it was suggested by several members that the Council's name be changed by deleting the term Advisory. This may become a Council legislative initiative. Until that time, the word should be used only when necessary.

The Council is an independent unit of the Executive Branch of the Federal Government charged by the Act of

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ing business in recent years because of the development of a computer technology specifically designed to manage it, and the House, appreciating that, gave its members each $12,000 a year to pay for computer services. This allowance is often used to compile selective mailing lists—rich constituents, say, or politically active constituents—to whom frequent, small mailings can be sent.

These special mailing lists have another important advantage. Congressmen cannot send explicitly campaign-related material at public expense. What they can do at public expense is have a computer firm work up special mailing lists for official congressional material. Then, when the time comes for campaign mailings, a congressman can go back to the same firm and buy the same list with campaign money, at much less expense than an opponent who would need to work up specialized lists afresh.

The Biggest Perk of All

Besides mailing there are other common campaign expenses incumbent congressmen can get free. There are government-subsidized radio and television studios on Capitol Hill in which incumbents can make their commercials; challengers have to rent studio space. Incumbents get about $10,000 worth of free government publications a year, which can be distributed to voters after being stamped "Compliments of Congressman Jones." There is a Capitol Office Supply Service where incumbents can spend $6,500 of public money a year on stationery, office supplies, books, gifts, and pen and pencil sets that are sold at reduced rates.

But the biggest, and least tangible, perquisite of all is staff time. Congressmen are paid $44,625 a year (too low, they often complain) and can spend another $257,144 to pay staff. Certainly this money is in theory allotted toward the perfectly legitimate goal of legislating, but the blend of legislating and campaigning is a subtle one. One scholar, David Mayhew, has argued persuasively that the chief motive behind everything congressmen and their staffs do is winning reelection. Huge chunks of the work done on Capitol Hill—constituent casework, for instance—is of quite tangible campaign value, since it consists of doing favors for people and is seldom accompanied by reflection about the root causes of constituents' problems or about how to avoid those problems in the future.

And everyone admits that much of the work done by congressmen and their staffs—particularly administrative assistants and press secretaries—is explicitly campaign-related. The standard explanation is that an informal "40-hour rule" is in effect—everyone works from nine to five for his public salary, so it's okay if the rest of the ten-hour, 12-hour, and 16-hour days that are common on the Hill sometimes are spent campaigning.

This leaves challengers at considerable disadvantage. They have no staffs and no facilities that come free. While congressmen can campaign, sometimes full time, and continue to draw full salaries, challengers often must leave their jobs to run for office. Federal election law prohibits corporations from paying salaries to active candidates and prohibits candidates' use of corporate facilities for campaigning.

Not counting salaries, a congressman gets more than $400,000 a term in campaign help from the government, and since that figure accounts for no staff time at all, it's probably quite low. The most popular proposed way of reforming congressional campaigns is public funding, but that's not likely to even out the huge hidden financial advantages of incumbency. Those advantages far exceed the most generous conceivable campaign spending limit, and considering who is in charge of monitoring them, there's not much chance of their being curtailed. ■

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Big Government: A Congressman's Best Friend

by Morris P. Fiorina

In this article I will set out a theory of the Washington establishment(s). The theory is quite plausible from a common sense standpoint, and it is consistent with the specialized literature of academic political science. Nevertheless, it is still a theory, not proven fact. Before plunging in let me bring out in the open the basic axiom on which the theory rests: the self-interest axiom.

I assume that most people most of the time act in their own self-interest. This is not to say that human beings seek only to amass tangible wealth, but rather to say that human beings seek to achieve their own ends—tangible and intangible—rather than the ends of their fellow men. I do not condemn such behavior nor do I condone it (although I rather sympathize with Thoreau's comment that "if I knew for a certainty that a man was coming to my house with the conscious design of doing me good, I should run for my life"). I only claim that political and economic theories that presume self-interest behavior will prove to be more widely applicable than those that build on more altruistic assumptions.

What does the axiom imply when used in the specific context of this article, a context peopled by congressmen, bureaucrats, and voters? I assume that the primary goal of the typical congressman is reelection. Over and above the $57,000 salary plus "perks" and outside money, the office of congressman carries with it prestige, excitement, and power. It is a seat in the cockpit of government. But in order to retain the status, excitement, and power (not to mention more tangible things) of office, the congressman must win reelection every two years. Even those congress-

Morris P. Fiorina teaches political science at California Institute of Technology. This article is excerpted from his book, Congress—Keystone of the Washington Establishment, *to be published in April by Yale Univ. Press.*

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

Illustrations by Jennifer Harper

men genuinely concerned with good public policy must achieve reelection in order to continue their work. Whether narrowly self-serving or more publicly oriented, the individual congressman finds reelection to be at least a necessary condition for the achievement of his goals.

Moreover, there is a kind of natural selection process at work in the electoral arena. On average, those congressmen who are not primarily interested in reelection will not achieve reelection as often as those who are interested. We, the people, help to weed out congressmen whose primary motivation is not reelection. We admire politicians who courageously adopt the aloof role of the disinterested statesman, but we vote for those politicians who follow our wishes and do us favors.

What about the bureaucrats? A specification of their goals is somewhat more controversial. The literature provides ample justification for asserting that most bureaucrats wish to protect and nurture their agencies. The typical bureaucrat can be expected to seek to expand his agency in terms of personnel, budget, and mission. One's status in Washington is roughly proportional to the importance of the operation one oversees. And the sheer size of the operation is taken to be a measure of importance. As with congressmen, the specified goals apply even to those bureaucrats who genuinely believe in their agencies' missions. If they believe in the efficacy of their programs, they naturally wish to expand them and add new ones. All of this requires more money and more people.

And what of the third element in the equation, us? What do we, the voters who support the Washington system, strive for? Each of us wishes to receive a maximum of benefits from government for the minimum cost. This goal suggests maximum government efficiency, on the one hand, but it also suggests mutual exploitation on the other. Each of us

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favors an arrangement in which our fellow citizens pay for our benefits.

With these brief descriptions of the cast of characters in hand, let us proceed.

The First Priority

What should we expect from a legislative body composed of people whose first priority is their continued tenure in office? We should expect, first, that the normal activities of its members are those calculated to enhance their chances of reelection. And we should expect, second, that the members would devise and maintain institutional arrangements that facilitate their electoral activities.

For most of the twentieth century, congressmen have engaged in a mix of three kinds of activities: lawmaking, pork-barreling, and casework. Congress is first and foremost a lawmaking body, at least according to constitutional theory. In every postwar session Congress "considers" thousands of bills and resolutions, many hundreds of which are brought to a record vote (over 500 in each chamber in the 93rd Congress). Naturally the critical consideration in taking a position for the record is the maximization of approval in the home district. If the district is unaffected by and unconcerned with the matter at hand, the congressman may then take into account the general welfare of the country. (This sounds cynical, but remember that "profiles in courage" are sufficiently rare that their occurrence inspires books and articles.) Politicians have propounded an ideology that maintains that the good of the country on any given issue is simply what is best for a majority of congressional districts. This ideology provides a philosophical justification for what congressmen do while acting in their own self-interest.

A second activity favored by congressmen consists of efforts to bring home the bacon to their districts. Many popular articles have been written about the pork barrel, a term originally applied to rivers and harbors legislation but now generalized to cover all manner of federal buildings, sewage treatment plants, urban renewal projects, etc. as sweet plums to be plucked. The average constituent may have trouble translating his congressman's vote on some civil rights issue into a change in his own personal welfare. But the workers hired and supplies purchased in connection with a big federal project provide benefits that are widely appreciated.

The importance congressmen attach to the pork barrel is reflected in the rules of the House. That body accords certain classes of legislation "privileged" status: they may come directly to the floor without passing through the Rules Committee, a traditional graveyard for legislation. What kinds of legislation are privileged? Taxing and spending bills, for one: the government's power to raise and spend money must be kept relatively unfettered. But in addition, the omnibus rivers and harbors bills of the Public Works Committee and public lands bills from the Interior Committee share privileged status. The House will allow a civil rights or defense procurement or environmental bill to languish in the Rules Committee, but it takes special precautions to insure that nothing slows down the approval of dams and irrigation projects.

Speeding Up the Process

A third major activity takes up perhaps as much time as the other two combined. Traditionally, constituents appeal to their congressmen for myriad favors and services. Sometimes only information is needed, but often constituents request that their congressmen intervene in the internal workings of federal agencies to affect a decision in a favorable way, to reverse an adverse decision, or simply to speed up the glacial bureaucratic process. On the basis of extensive personal interviews with congressmen, Charles Clapp writes:

"Denied a favorable ruling by the

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bureaucracy on a matter of direct concern to him, puzzled or irked by delays in obtaining a decision, confused by the administrative maze through which he is directed to proceed, or ignorant of whom to write, a constituent may turn to his congressman for help. These letters offer great potential for political benefit to the congressman since they affect the constituent personally. If the legislator can be of assistance, he may gain a firm ally; if he is indifferent, he may even lose votes."

Actually congressmen are in an almost unique position in our system, a position shared only with high-level members of the executive branch. Congressmen possess the power to expedite and influence bureaucratic decision. This capability flows directly from congressional control over what bureaucrats value most: higher budgets and new program authorizations. In a very real sense each congressman is a monopoly supplier of bureaucratic unsticking services for his district.

Bleeding All Over the Capital

Every year the federal budget passes through the appropriations committees and subcommittees of Congress. Generally these committees make perfunctory cuts. But on occasion they vent displeasure on an agency and leave it bleeding all over the capital. The most extreme case of which I am aware came when the House committee took away the entire budget of the Division of Labor Standards in 1947 (some of the budget was restored elsewhere in the appropriations process). Professors Richard Fenno and Aaron Wildavsky have provided extensive documentary and interview evidence of the great respect (and even terror) federal bureaucrats show for the House Appropriations Committee. Moreover, the bureaucracy must keep coming back to Congress to have its old programs reauthorized and new ones added. Again, most such decisions are perfunctory, but exceptions are sufficiently frequent that bureaucrats do not forget the hand that feeds them. For example, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and the Food Stamps Program had no easy time of it this last Congress. The bureaucracy needs congressional approval in order to survive, let alone expand. Thus, when a congressman calls about some minor bureaucratic decision or regulation, the bureaucracy considers his accommodation a small price to pay for the goodwill its cooperation will produce, particularly if he has any connection to the substantive committee or the appropriations subcommittee to which it reports.

From the standpoint of capturing voters, the congressman's lawmaking activities differ in two important respects from his pork barrel and casework activities. First, legislative programs are inherently controversial. Unless his district is homogeneous, a congressman will find his district divided on many major issues. Thus when he casts a vote, introduces a piece of non-trivial legislation, or makes a speech with policy content, he will displease some elements of his district. Some constituents may applaud the congressman's civil rights record, but others believe integration is going too fast. Some support foreign aid, while others believe it's money poured down a rat hole. Some advocate economic equality, others stew over welfare cheaters. On such policy matters the congressman can expect to make friends as well as enemies.

In contrast, the pork barrel and casework are relatively less controversial. New federal projects bring jobs, shiny new facilities, and general economic prosperity, or so people believe. Snipping ribbons at the dedication of a new post office or dam is a much more pleasant pursuit than disposing of a constitutional amendment on abortion. Republicans and Democrats, conservatives and liberals, all generally prefer a richer district to

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a poorer one. Of course, in recent years the river-damming and stream-bed-straightening activities of the Army Corps of Engineers have aroused some oppostion among environmentalists. Congressmen happily reacted by absorbing the opposition and adding environmentalism to the pork barrel: water treatment plants are currently a hot congressional item.

Casework is even less controversial. Some poor, aggrieved constituent becomes enmeshed in the tentacles of an evil bureaucracy and calls upon Congressman St. George to do battle with the dragon. Again, Clapp writes:

"A person who has a reasonable complaint or query is regarded as providing an opportunity rather than as adding an extra burden to an already busy office. The party affiliation of the individual, even when known to be different from that of the congressman, does not normally act as a deterrent to action. Some legislators have built their reputations and their majorities on a program of service to all constituents irrespective of party. Regularly, voters affiliated with the opposition in other contests lend strong support to the lawmaker whose intervention has helped them in their struggle with the bureaucracy."

Even following the revelation of his sexual improprieties, Wayne Hays won his Ohio Democratic primary by a two-to-one margin. According to a *Los Angeles Times* feature story, Hays' constituency base was built on a foundation of personal service to constituents:



"They receive help in speeding up bureaucratic action on various kinds of federal assistance—black lung benefits to disabled miners and their families, Social Security payments, veterans' benefits, and passports.

"Some constituents still tell with pleasure of how Hays stormed clear to the seventh floor of the State Department and into Secretary of State Dean Rusk's office to demand, successfully, the quick issuance of a passport to an

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Ohioan." Practicing politicians will tell you that word of mouth is still the most effective mode of communication. News of favors to constituents gets around and is no doubt embellished in the process.

In sum, when considering the benefits of his programmatic activities, the congressman must tote up gains and losses to arrive at a net profit. Pork-barreling and casework, however, are basically pure profit.

A second way in which lawmaking differs from casework and the pork barrel is the difficulty of claiming credit for the former as compared with the latter. No congressman can seriously claim that he was responsible for the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the ABM, or the 1972 Revenue Sharing Act. Most constituents do have some vague notion that their congressman is only one of hundreds and their senator one of an even hundred. Even committee chairmen, let alone a rank-and-file congressman, may have a difficult time claiming credit for a piece of major legislation.

The Snap To Attention

Ah, but casework, and the pork barrel. In dealing with the bureaucracy, the congressman is not merely one vote of 435. Rather, he is a nonpartisan power, someone whose phone calls snap an office to attention. The constituent who receives aid believes that his congressman and his congressman alone got results. Similarly, congressmen find it easy to claim credit for federal projects awarded their districts. The congressman may have instigated the proposal for the project in the first place, issued regular progress reports, and ultimately announced the award through his office. Maybe he can't claim credit for the 1965 Voting Rights Act, but he can take credit for Littletown's spanking new sewage treatment plant.

Overall then, programmatic activities are dangerous, and programmatic accomplishments are difficult to claim credit for. While less exciting, casework and pork-barreling are both safe and profitable. For a reelection-oriented congressman the choice is obvious.

The key to the rise of a semi-permanent Washington establishment (and the fall of the non-safe congressional seat) is the following observation: *the growth of an activist federal government has stimulated a change in the mix of congressional activities.* Specifically, a lesser proportion of congressional effort is now going into programmatic activities and a greater proportion into pork-barrel and casework activities. As a result, today's congressmen make relatively fewer enemies and relatively more friends among the people of their districts. Hence, more safe seats.

To elaborate, a basic fact of life in twentieth-century America is the growth of the federal role and its attendant bureaucracy. Bureaucracy is the characteristic mode of delivering public goods and services. *Ceteris paribus,* the more the government attempts to do for people, the more extensive a bureaucracy it creates. As the scope of government expands, more and more citizens find themselves in direct contact with the federal government. Consider the rise in such contacts upon passage of the Social Security Act, work relief projects, and other New Deal programs. Consider the millions of additional citizens touched by the veterans' programs of the postwar period. Consider the untold numbers whom the Great Society and its aftermath brought face to face with the federal government. In 1930 the federal bureaucracy was small and rather distant from the everyday concerns of Americans. Nowadays it is neither small nor distant.

As the years have passed, more and more citizens and groups have found themselves dealing with the federal bureaucracy. They may be seeking positive actions—eligibilty for various benefits and awards of government grants. Or they may be seeking relief

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from the costs imposed by bureaucratic regulations—on working conditions, racial and sexual quotas, market restrictions, and numerous other subjects. While not malevolent, bureaucracies make mistakes in their dealings with the citizenry, both of commission and omission, and normal attempts at redress often meet with unresponsiveness and inflexibility and sometimes seeming incorrigibility. Whatever the problems, the citizen's congressman is a source of succor. The greater the scope of government activity, the greater the demand for his services.

Creative Pork-Barreling

In addition to greatly increasing casework, let us not forget that the growth of the federal role has also greatly expanded the federal pork barrel. The creative pork-barreler need not limit himself to dams and post offices—rather old-fashioned interests. Today, creative congressmen can cadge LEAA money for the local police, urban renewal and housing money for local politicians, and educational program grants for the local education bureaucracy. There are also sewage treatment plants, worker training and retraining programs, health services, and programs for the elderly. The pork barrel is full to overflowing. The conscientious congressman can stimulate applications for federal assistance (the sheer number of programs makes it difficult for local officials to stay current with the possibilities), put in a good word during consideration, and announce favorable decisions amid great fanfare.

In sum, everyday decisions by a large and growing federal bureaucracy bestow significant tangible benefits and impose significant tangible costs. Congressmen can affect these decisions. Ergo, the more decisions the bureaucracy has the opportunity to make, the more opportunities there are for the congressman to build up credits.

The nature of the Washington system is thus quite clear. Congressmen (typically the majority Democrats) earn electoral credits by establishing various federal programs (the minority Republicans typically earn credits by fighting the good fight). The legislation is drafted in very general terms, so some agency, existing or newly established, must translate a vague policy mandate into a functioning program, a process that necessitates the promulgation of numerous rules and regulations and, incidentally, the trampling of numerous toes. At the next stage, aggrieved and/or hopeful constituents petition their congressmen to intervene in the complex (or at least obscure) decision processes of the bureaucracy. The cycle closes when the congressman lends a sympathetic ear, piously denounces the evils of bureaucracy, intervenes in the latter's decisions, and rides a grateful electorate to ever more impressive electoral showings. Congressmen take credit coming and going. They are the alpha and the omega.

The popular frustration with the permanent government in Washington is partly justified, but to a considerable degree it is misplaced resentment. *Congress is the linchpin of the Washington establishment.* The bureaucracy serves as a convenient lightning rod for public frustration and a convenient whipping boy for congressmen. But as long as the bureaucracy accommodates congressmen, they will oblige with ever larger budgets and grants of authority. Congress does not just react to big government—it creates it. All of Washington prospers. More and more bureaucrats promulgate more and more regulations and dispense more and more money. Fewer and fewer congressmen suffer electoral defeat. Elements of the electorate benefit from government programs, and all of the electorate is eligible for congressional ombudsman services. But the general, long-term welfare of the United States is no more than an incidental by-product of the system. ■

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political book notes

Public affairs books to be published in March.

The American Catholic: A Social Portrait. Andrew M. Greeley. Basic, $15.

The American Monomyth. Robert Jewett, John Shelton Lawrence. Doubleday, $8.95.

Baseball and the Cold War: A Soliloquy on the Necessity of Baseball. Howard Senzel. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, $8.95.

Books That Changed the South. Robert B. Downs. Univ. of North Carolina, $10.95.

Carl Rogers on Personal Power. Carl Rogers. Delacorte, $10.

The Children's Rights Movement: Overcoming the Oppression of Young People. Beatrice and Ronald Gross, eds. Doubleday/Anchor, $9.95/$3.95.

The CIA's Secret Operations: Espionage, Counter-Espionage, and Covert Action. Harry Rositzke. Reader's Digest, $12.95.

The Collapse of Liberal Empire: Science and Revolution in the Twentieth Century. Paul N. Goldstene. Yale Univ., $10.

Convention. Richard Reeves. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, $10. A highly entertaining account of the 1976 Democratic National Convention, featuring whores and lieutenant governors as well as presidential candidates, by the former political writer for *New York*. However, the author's mind, which can be very good, is not on conspicuous display here.

Denial of Justice: Criminal Process in the United States. Lloyd L. Weinreb. Free Press, $12.95.

Does Anybody Give a Damn? Nat Hentoff. Knopf, $8.95.

FSO-1. Harris Greene. Doubleday, $7.95.

The Future of the Humanities. Walter Kaufmann. Reader's Digest, $8.95. The author says we have too many teachers of the humanities who are scholastic technicians focusing unimaginatively on narrow slices of learning. On the other hand, he finds far too few Socratic critics "committed to rigorous examination of the faith and morals of the time, giving pride of place to those convictions which are widely shared and rarely questioned." He urges an interdisciplinary approach that would restore life and relevance—a word whose recent abuse he fully understands—to the humanities by courses that focus on important issues and draw their materials from the entire range of knowledge. Thus a course on punishment would use Greek tragedies, Russian novels, philosophy, anthropology, religion, and law. In all of this the author is undoubtedly right, about how to save not only the humanities but also the subject called Political Science, which desperately needs a similar opportunity.

Gates of Eden: American Culture in the Sixties. Morris Dickstein. Basic, $11.95. This is an ambitious attempt to define the 1960s—its roots, its music, art, fiction, and journalism, its politics, and its consequences. It's a fascinating subject, which is why it's been written about so often, and because of that the book doesn't say anything strikingly new. Dickstein is a smart man with a keen eye for intellectual history, but this isn't the brilliant synthesis of the last two decades that he seems to have intended it to be.

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The Golden Egg—The Personal Income Tax: Where It Came From, How It Grew. Gerald Carson. Houghton Mifflin, $10. Without a doubt the government's one key domestic policy in this century—because of its magnitude and because of the degree of federal power it implies—the income tax is, sadly, usually discussed only in polemical or technical terms. This book, which does neither, is thus especially welcome: it's an exhaustively researched, well written, understandable, even entertaining history of the tax. Its main point is that what started as a levy on the affluent alone evolved into a levy that is toughest on the non-affluent—but that sticks in the mind less than does Carson's meticulous story-telling. This is a natural topic for a book, carried out better than could be expected.

The Great Debates: Kennedy vs. Nixon, 1960. Sidney Kraus, ed. Indiana Univ., $15/$4.95.

Grow Or Die: The Overpopulation Myth. James A. Weber. Arlington House, $11.95.

Hoover, Roosevelt, and the Brains Trust: From Depression to New Deal. Elliot A. Rosen. Columbia Univ., $16.95.

Hugo Black and the Judicial Revolution. Gerald T. Dunne. Simon & Schuster, $11.95.

The Inequality of Nations. Robert W. Tucker. Basic, $10.95. One of our more original thinkers about foreign affairs says that we have nothing to fear from the underdeveloped world as long as we meet its reasonable demands, e.g., for more stable commodity prices. The problem is that he pays much too little attention to the unreasonable terrorists and has too little sympathy for the emotions of people who have been left out too long. He devotes but one page to the dangers of nuclear terrorism, and that to dismissing it, which not only means that he must know very little about the accessibility of nuclear technology and

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Jury: The People vs. Juan Corona. Victor Villasenor. Little, Brown, $8.95.

LBJ the Way He Was. Frank Cormier. Doubleday, $8.95. Lots of amusing anecdotes about LBJ, unencumbered by anything at all heavy.

The Moon and the Ghetto: An Essay on Public Policy Analysis. Richard R. Nelson. Norton, $7.95.

Nation-Building and Citizenship: Studies of Our Changing Social Order. Reinhard Bendix. Univ. of California, $24.50/$5.95.

Nursing Homes. Linda Horn, Elma Griesel. Beacon, $8.95/$2.95.

The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism Before Its Triumph. Albert O. Hirschman. Princeton, $10/$2.95.

Playing the Price Controls Game. Mark Skousen. Arlington House, $9.95.

The Reason for Democracy. Kalman H. Silvert. Viking Penguin, $8.95. At a time of an increasing separation of a meritocratic elite from the rest of the people, this reasoned reaffirmation of the democratic faith is needed and welcome.

The Secret History of the Atomic Bomb. Anthony Cave Brown, Charles B. MacDonald, eds. Dial, $14.95.

Sound of Impact: The Legacy of TWA Flight 514. Adam David Shaw. Viking, $10.

Thunder of the Captains: The Short Summer of 1950. David Detzer. T.Y. Crowell, $9.95.

Traditions of Amerian Education. Lawrence A. Cremin. Basic, $8.95.

A Visit to Haldeman and Other States of Mind. Charles L. Mee, Jr. M. Evans, $8.95. The author of a good, straightforward book on the Potsdam conference made the fatal mistake of deciding that his own ruminations were interesting, and he has made them into a very bad book. The general theme is reflections on the possibility of Mee ghostwriting H. R. Haldeman's memoirs, but the book is devoted mostly to Mee's own life and his barely coherent thoughts about the nature of America. The lesson here is that untrammeled self-indulgence does not have much to do with insight or creativity.

We Almost Made It. Malcolm D. MacDougall. Crown, $8.95. This is a *Selling of*

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the President in reverse—it's President Ford's 1976 adman who's telling the story of the campaign, and he does so with great pride in his accomplishments and faith in advertising generally. The result, however, hardly inspires trust in the advertising business, or in politics. It's clear that MacDougal has to keep reminding himself that Ford is a person and not a product. What Ford actually stands for is of no importance to MacDougal; although he goes through long explanations of how he took the account for idealistic reasons, the President seems to have mattered to him chiefly as a prestige client. All this is told breathlessly, in ad-copy prose. There are no long sentences. They're all short. Like this.

The great value of this book is in its potential for disabusing readers of any lofty notions they may have had about how campaigns, politics, even government are run. Even at their best, presented sympathetically, there remain telling incidents like this, from a discussion of Ford's slogan:

" 'I think the word "Freedom" is essential,' Doug said. 'A new statement on what the Fourth of July was really all about.'

" 'How about a new *Dimension* of freedom,' I suggested. . . .

" 'Now,' said Doug, 'all we have to do is figure out what it is.' . . .

" 'One small question,' I said, opening my Pentab and getting ready to go to work, 'Does he actually *have* any programs for the future?'

" 'As a matter of fact, he does,' said Doug. 'Scattered programs—without any real direction. . . . There's plenty of existing stuff we can use. Lots of stuff we can recommend. If we have the umbrella, the organizing concept, we have a whole government full of experts who can come up with the programs to put under it.' "

Without Fear or Favor. LeRoy F. Harlow. Brigham Young Univ., $11.95. LeRoy Harlow spent 30 years as the city manager of various small-to-middling towns around America, and he seems to have done his job with skill, dedication, and even flair. Unfortunately, however, hats cannot go off to him as an author—this is a well-intentioned but humdrum account of a lot of minor problems, probably of far greater interest to other city managers than to the rest of us.

Work, Aging, and Social Change: Professionals and the One Life—One Career Imperative. Seymour B. Sarason. Free Press, $14.95.

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